Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission

By this proceeding it is sought to annul an order of the Industrial Accident Commission dated February 29, 1932. Joseph Elbert Huston was injured July 26, 1928, during the course of his employment with the petitioner, which corporation was at the time self-insured. The petitioner paid compensation to Huston at the rate of $20.83 per week at all times subsequent to one week following the accident, together with all hospital and medical expenses. However, on May 14, 1930, Huston filed an application asking for an adjustment of his claim, alleging that his injuries were caused by the serious and wilful misconduct of his employer, the petitioner. After a hearing thereon the respondent Commission determined that the accident was occasioned by the serious and wilful misconduct and ordered the compensation increased by one-half. Upon the petition of the employer, however, a rehearing was granted and the Commission arrived at a different conclusion. The respondent Huston then petitioned for a rehearing, which was denied, following which order he petitioned this court for a writ of review, which was denied, and the award became final. Subsequently and on November 5, 1931, he filed with the…

I concur.

In concurring I wish to express my opinion that any break in the rule of finality of decision is regrettable. Courts presided over by trained judges are very strictly limited in their power of opening cases after judgment. The value of knowing that a certain judgment is final is greater in most cases than the possibility of advantageous change. The temptation to present perjured or colored testimony to meet a condition revealed in the first trial is often too great to be successfully resisted. These are good reasons, and there are others, supporting the doctrine of finality of decision as applied to courts. They certainly apply with equal force to judgments rendered by commissions untrained in our system of jurisprudence.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on October 21, 1932, and an application by petitioner to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on November 21, 1932.