Extradition—Sufficiency of Papers—Power of Courts to Go Beyond Executive Warrant and Determine.—Upon the application of a person held fdr extradition as a fugitive from justice to be discharged on habeas corpus, the court is empowered to go beyond the executive warrant and examine and determine the question of the sufficiency of the papers upon which the executive has acted in complying with the demand of the demanding state.

Id.—Decision of Governor Only Prima Facie Correct.—The decision of the governor makes only a prima facie ease, and it is competent for a court on habeas corpus to inquire into the correctness of his decision and discharge the prisoner.

Id.—Evidence on Which Fugitive is Held—-Eight of Courts to Review.-—Where the evidence adduced before the governor upon the question whether the prisoner whose extradition is sought is a fugative from justiee of the demanding state is in substantial conflict, the finding of the executive that he is such fugitive will not be set aside by the courts, but such question of fact is a subject which may be reviewed by the courts, and upon which the prisoner may be discharged from custody, if it is made to appear that he was not within the borders of the demanding state at practically the precise time at which the alleged crime upon which he is proposed to be extradited was committed.

Id.—Prerequisites to Extradition of Fugitive—Showing Necessary to be Made by Demanding State.—It must appear to the governor of a state to whom a demand in extradition proceedings is presented, before he can lawfully comply with it: 1. That the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justiee he is alleged to have fled by an indictment or an affidavit certified or authenticated by the governor of the state making the demand; and 2. That the person demanded is a fugitive from the justiee of the state the executive authority of which makes the demand.

Id.—Questions of Law and of Fact Reviewable on Habeas Corpus.— The first of these prerequisites is a question of law, and is always open upon the face of the papers to judicial inquiry, on an application for a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus; the second prerequisite involves a question of fact whether the decision of the governor that the prisoner is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state is well founded or justified, and it also is subject to judicial review on habeas corpus.

Id.—Judicial Review of Action of Executive—Sufficiency of Evidence—Discharge of Prisoner.—As the executive, before he can authorize the extradition of a resident of his state to another for trial on a criminal charge, must be shown by competent proof that the person whose extradition is sought is a fugitive from the justiee of the demanding state, it is within the legal competence of courts to review the action of the executive in that respect, and to discharge the prisoner if it is found that the exercise of the executive authority, so far as that fact is concerned, was predicated upon insufficient proof, or in the presence of evidence offered by the prisoner sufficient to destroy the force of the prima facie showing by the state upon that point.

Id.—Presence of Accused Within Demanding State at Time of Grime—Review of Question.—The right to review on habeas corpus the question whether or not the petitioner was in the demanding state when the crime for which his extradition is requested was committed, is not precluded on the ground that it involves the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime, as attempting to set up an alibi, for the question presented is not whether the petitioner was present at the scene of the alleged crime when it was committed, but whether he was within the borders of the demanding state on that day, and if it is not thus shown, he is entitled to his discharge.

Id.—Jurisdictional Fact—Presence of Prisoner When Crime Committed.—Before a warrant of extradition can be sustained, it must appear as a jurisdictional fact that the prisoner is a fugitive from justice; that is, it must be shown that he was actually present in the demanding state when the crime was committed. Mere constructive presence is not enough.

Id.—Indictment Accompanying Demand for Fugitive—Allegation as to Date of Crime—Absence of Accused at Time Alleged.— Where an indictment accompanying a demand for extradition charges the commission of a crime without qualification and unequivocally on á certain date, and by neither specific nor general language pretends to fix or allege any other date, it must clearly appear by competent proof, direct or circumstantial, that the accused was in the demanding state on that day, and if it is not thus shown, he is entitled to be discharged.

Id.—Flight of Accused—Indictment as Evidence.—An indictment charging a person with the commission of a • certain crime in the demanding state, constitutes, if any at all, very remote evidence of flight or of the fact that the accused is a fugitive from justice.

Id.—Presence of Accused in Demanding State at Time of Crime— Proof Concerning.-—If in support of the application for a warrant of extradition, the only affidavits presented are those which aver the presence of the accused in the demanding state eighteen days prior and three weeks subsequent to the date alleged in the indictment, such showing falls short of satisfactorily establishing that he is a fugitive from justice; but if it is conceded that such affidavits, together with the conclusion stated in the affidavit of the state’s attorney that the accused “is a fugitive from justice,” are sufficient to make out a primo facie case, yet the same can be overcome by a slight adversary showing, and is overcome by affidavits on behalf of the accused establishing that he was not in the demanding state at any time within two weeks of the alleged date of the crime.

Id.—Date of Crime—Necessity of Showing or Establishing Exact Time.—There is no analogy between the general proposition that upon the trial of one charged with crime it is not required that the people shall prove, in order to sustain a conviction, that the crime was committed at the precise date specified in the indictment, and the proposition involved here, where, to constitute a person a fugitive from justice, it is indispensably necessary to show that the person whose extradition is sought was in the demanding state at the exact time of the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

Id.—Habeas Corpus—Rehearing—Power to G;Rant.—After judgment in habeas corpus proceedings, either remanding or discharging the petitioner, the district court of appeal has no power to grant a rehearing; and it is immaterial that he may be allowed to give bail for his appearance pending the hearing of his application.

Id.—Finality of Judgment in Habeas Cokpus.—A proceeding in habeas corpus is finally and definitely ended by judgment.