Election Contest—Jurisdiction of Superior Court.—The jurisdiction of the superior court to hear and determine election contests is included within the jurisdiction conferred upon said court by section 5 of article VI of the constitution of all such special eases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.

Id.—Premature Order and Citation—Knowledge of Proceeding.— An order for a citation made on the date of the filing of the contest is unauthorized and may be disregarded, .except in so far as it is record evidence of knowledge of the proceeding, and a citation issued thereon can have no legal effect.

Id.—Notice by Clerk to Court of Filing Contest—Purpose.—The provision of the statute requiring the clerk to notify the court of the filing of the contest is a means provided for calling the pend-ency of the contest to the attention of the court, in order that the

^ court may make a timely order calling a special session for the hearing of such action.

Id.—Notice not Required to be Written.—The statute does not require that the clerk’s notification to the court of the filing of the contest must of necessity be in writing.

Id.—Court’s Knowledge—Notice not Required.—It affirmatively appearing that the court had actual notice of the filing of the contest on the day of its date, it was not necessary for the clerk to give a formal notification in order that the court might be apprised of the pendency of the proceeding. The prior knowledge was still in the breast of the court on the day when it made its order calling a special session to hear the contest.

Id.—Construction of Statute—Time for Order After Notification —Word “Thereupon”—Reasonable Time.-—The statute directing that the court, after notification by the clerk, “shall thereupon order a special session,” does not by the use of the word “thereupon”' import “immediately,” but only “within a reasonable time.”

Id.—Lapse of Six Days After Expiration of Thirty Days from Statement not Unreasonable — Jurisdiction of Subject Matter.—The lapse of six days after the expiration of thirty days from the filing of the contesting statement was not unreasonable, and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the subject matter, under the general law, to make the order fixing the date for the commencement of the session for hearing the contest, where it appears that such date was within twenty days from the time when the court was first authorized to act, and exceeded ten days, the minimum of time designated in the statute.

Id.—Jurisdiction of Person of Contestee—Demurrer to Statement —General Appearance—Defects in Citation Waived.—Where the contestee upon the date when the order was made calling the special session, appeared and interposed a general demurrer to the statement of the contestant, such demurrer had the effect of a general appearance, giving the court full jurisdiction over the person of the contestee; and had the effect to waive all neglect of the clerk to issue the citation in proper form or the service thereof, which became immaterial upon the question of personal jurisdiction.

Id.—Contest for Office of Mayor — Municipal Affairs — Election Under Freeholders’ Charter — General Laws Applicable.—Although the election of a mayor under a freeholders’ charter is a municipal affair, and if a contest were provided thereunder it would be a municipal affair, yet such charters are subject to general laws not in conflict therewith, and in the absence of a charter provision for such contest, the general laws of the state are applicable thereto.

Id.—Jurisdiction of Contest—Prohibition not Allowed.—It appearing that the superior court had jurisdiction both of the subject matter of the contest and of the person of the parties before it, a writ of prohibition cannot be allowed regardless of any question as to the adequacy of the remedy by appeal.