The defendants, who are of the Mongolian race, were convicted of robbing another Chinaman, and they appeal from the judgment and the order denying their motion for a new trial.

Several assignments of error are made, but, save one, we deem them'without substantial merit.

During the cross-examination of one of the defendants the following proceedings, as shown by the transcript, took place:

In reference to the foregoing we deem it proper to make the following observations: The learned trial judge readily perceived that the questions were improper, and promptly sustained objections thereto. He went further, and endeavored to fortify the minds of the jury against any unfavorable impression that might be created by what is assigned as the misconduct of the district attorney. It is, nevertheless, true that this officer is the representative of the people in a very important capacity, is generally of consequence in the community, and it is a reasonable and almost necessary inference that some at least of the jurors would conclude that the district attorney would not ask stich questions unless he could prove what was implied in such questions if he had been allowed to do so. The result of this impression would be the opinion that the defendant is a man of bad character, and likely to commit the crime charged against him. It is apparent that this circumstance may have weighed decisively against the defendants here, and we cannot say that otherwise they would have been convicted in the f ce of the directly conflicting evidence. The effect upon 1 minds of the jury would be the same whether the distr attorney was acting'in good faith or with a purpose of prej dicing the defendants. Of course, in the trial of crimin. . cases questions will frequently arise about which lawyers and judges may fairly differ in opinion, and in those cases defendants cannot complain of the mere asking of questions to which an objection may be sustained, but there are certain elementary rules of evidence so clearly established and fundamental rights of persons charged with crime so generally recognized, that any infraction or invasion of them cannot be ■justified or excused on the ground of ignorance or good faith, even. It is a trite saying, but its repetition seems not uncalled for, that a fair trial for the defendant should invite and receive from the district attorney the same solicitous consideration as the conviction of the guilty. If the district attorney should be more anxious to win a victory in the lower court than to accord to the defendant the rights that he is entitled to under the constitution, he must not be surprised if his success comes to naught in the higher forum. The case is brought within the principle announced in People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459 , [ 34 Pac. 1078 ], People v. Valliere, 127 Cal. 65 , [ 59 Pac. 295 ], People v. Derbert, 138 Cal. 467 , [ 71 Pac. 564 ], and People v. Derwae, 155 Cal. 592 , [ 102 Pac. 266 ].

As the defendants were jointly charged with the crime and tried together, it is probable that they were all prejudiced alike by the said incidents.

The ground herein considered cannot be regarded on the motion for a new trial, but can be reviewed only on an appeal from the judgment. (People v. Amer, 151 Cal. 503 , [ 90 Pac. 698 ].) The effect of the reversal of the judgment is, obviously, the same as of the order denying the motion for a new trial, but, under the decisions as we view the matter, the order denying said motion should be affirmed and the judgment reversed, and it is só ordered.

Hart, J., and Chipman, P. J., concurred.