This is an application for a writ of mandate compelling the controller to issue his warrant for the payment of plaintiff's claim. As the matter was one of emergency and as at the argument we were fully convinced that the writ should issue, it was so ordered from the bench. By the request of all parties we will state the ease and the reasons for our conclusion.

It appears from the petition as follows: That the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District is “a body politic and corporate created by the act of the legislature of this state, approved December 24, 1911” (Stats. 1911, Extra Session, p. 117), as amended and supplemented by the act of May 26, 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 252), and was further amended and supplemented by the aet of June 9, 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 1338), which said act of 1911, as amended by said-act of 1915,'“is known and designated and referred to as the ‘Reclamation Board Act’ as provided in section 31 of said acts as so amended and supplemented”; that the reclamation hoard referred to in the petition was created and exists as provided for in said Reclamation Board Aet; “that the man agement and control of the said Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District is by virtue of section 5 of said Reclamation Board Act vested in the said reclamation board.” We quote from the petition:

A demurrer to the petition was interposed by respondent on the following grounds:

The insufficiency of the facts or the failure to disclose who is the real party in interest was not seriously urged. Nor do we think either point well taken. Unless the act in question is unconstitutional, mandamus is the appropriate remedy and the facts alleged were sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ. It clearly enough appears that petitioner is the real party in interest.

Is the act of January, 30,1919, violative of the constitution? It becomes necessary to ascertain the nature and character of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District.

The validity of the Reclamation Board1 Act is not called in question. The constitutionality of acts of this character was established and set at rest in the ease of People ear. rel. Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373 , [ 103 Pac. 207 ].

The origin, administrative and legislative history of the Reclamation Board Act, its nature, and character were concisely stated' at the argument by Mr. Robert T. Devlin, who appeared amicus curiae. The statement accords with our information upon the subject, and we, therefore, take the liberty of using it. We quote from the notes written by our stenographic reporter:

It is well to recall what the supreme court said in People v. Sacramento Drainage District, supra, in speaking of districts of the character of the one here. [1] Said the court: “It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons set forth for the decisions in those cases (cases cited), by which the conclusion there reached was expressed, to the effect that such districts are, in strictness, not corporations at all, but rather governmental agencies to carry out a specific purpose—the agency ceasing with the accomplishment of the purpose. But, additionally, it may be said that the likeness of these agencies to corporations is superficial, and that the similitude—for it is no more than this—ceases, if consideration be paid to the fact that the state could accomplish this very work without organizing a district as such at all, and without giving the land owners within the district any voice in the selection of the managers or trustees. Thus it would be perfectly legal and competent for the legislature, delimiting a tract of land, itself to appoint a commissioner or commissioners to perform all of the functions which, under the existing schemes, are performed by the trustees and the assessors.”

The act of 1911 created the reclamation board to consist of three members; adopted the plan of the California debris commission, empowering the board to make modifications, as a general scheme for reclamation flood control in the Sacramento Valley. The act of 1913 enlarged the board to seven members, created the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valley drainage district, and authorized the reclamation board to go forward with the construction of the project and to levy assessments on lands in the district in aid of that purpose. The act provided that in the carrying out of the work the board should divide it into separate projects or divisions, each to be taken up separately and a separate assessment levied therefor, each such project to have a distinctive name and number and its funds to be held separately.

These assessment funds are to be collected by the county treasurers in the counties affected and by them to be deposited in the state treasury and paid out by the state treasurer on warrants drawn by the controller against the state treasurer, as directed by the reclamation board, payable out of that particular assessment in each such separate project. Warrants may be drawn against-any assessment whenever it has been ordered by the reclamation board and the assessors have been appointed; these warrants may issue for work before the assessments are collected and when thus drawn may be presented to and registered by the state treasurer, who is authorized to register them and indorse them “not paid for want of funds,” and they shall thereafter bear interest from date of registration.

As alleged in the petition, the reclamation board adopted a project, known as Sutter-Butte by-pass project No. 6, and levied an assessment for its construction, known as SutterButte by-pass assessment No. 6, and appointed the assessors therefor. At this stage the controller was authorized to draw warrants for construction work against this assessment on the request of the reclamation board, in anticipation of collections on the assessment. The reclamation board was able to make contracts for work on the east levee of this by-pass, being part of the project No. 6, payable in warrants against its assessment No. 6. Arrangements were made whereby private interests cashed these warrants to a very considerable amount. This arrangement having ended and the necessity for the uninterrupted prosecution of the work being imperative, the act of January 30, 1919, was1 passed to meet the emergency.

This/ act, in effect, appropriated the sum of three hundred thousand dollars, and authorized the state board of control to purchase at their face value (to the extent of not exceeding said amount) any or all warrants of said drainage district drawn by the state controller, as provided by the Reclamation Board Act and payable out of said assessment and “issued in payment for the expense of continuing the construction of the east levee of the Sutter by-pass. ’ ’ Section 5 of said act provides: “The State Controller shall draw warrants upon the State Treasurer, payable out of said appropriation, in such amounts and at such times and in favor of such persons as the Board of Control may request, and the State Treasurer shall pay the same. ’ ’ After the passage of this act, petitioner, Argyle Dredging Company, continued to work under contract with the reclamation board and the claim here was allowed for $255 for such work. It was duly allowed by the reclamation board and approved by the board of control, the state controller drew and issued to petitioner his warrant against the reclamation board’s assessment No. 6, for $255, and it was registered by the state treasurer as not paid for want of funds. No question arises as to the regularity of the proceedings. The state board of control, however, contracted with petitioner, proceeding under the act of 1919, to purchase this warrant at its face value, and requested the state controller to direct the payment out of the fund thus appropriated. This the controller refused to do and hence the action.

[2] The constitution does not deprive the legislature of the power to pass all special acts. It forbids special laws in-all cases where a general law can be made applicable. (Sec. 25, subd. 33, art. IV.) It was said by the supreme court: “The legislature must, in the first instance, determine whether or not a general law can be made applicable in the particular case. The court will not interfere with its judgment on the subject, unless it clearly and beyond -a reasonable doubt appears that it adjudged contrary to the fact.” (Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 232 , [92. Pac. 353, 357], citing cases.) It does not appear and'it is not claimed that conditions such as prevail in the Sacramento and San Joaquin drainage district exist elsewhere in the state, nor do we think that a gen eral law could reasonably be made applicable. But as ivas said in People v. Mullender, 132 Cal. 217, 222 , [ 64 Pac. 299, 301 ] : “We certainly would not hold such a law invalid merely because it would, in our opinion, have been possible to frame a general law under which the same purpose could have been accomplished.” It was also there said: “The language of 'said paragraph (sec. 25, art. IV) plainly implies that there can or may be cases where a local or special act may be wise and salutary and appropriate, and in no wise promotive of those evils which result from a general and indiscriminate resort to local and special legislation.” [3] Such, in our judgment, is the case here.

[4] In no just sense can the act be said to violate section 31, article IY, which prohibits the giving or lending the credit of the state or making a gift “to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever. ” As we have seen (People v. Sacramento Drainage District, 155 Cal. 373 , [ 103 Pac. 207 ]), reclamation districts “are, in strictness, not corporations at all, but rather governmental agencies to carry out a- specific purpose—the agency ceasing with the accomplishing its purpose.” So completely are these districts so regarded, as we are informed, that their warrants are not taxable nor is the interest payable on those warrants taxable by the United States as income; so, also, are the salaries of the officers of such districts not subject to the payment of an income tax for the reason that the government regards them as part of the state.

Much more closely is the Sacramento and San Joaquin drainage district knitted to the state and really part of it than is the ordinary drainage district. Section 7 of the Reclamation Act of 1915 declares that “the State of California and the people thereof are hereby declared to have a primary and supreme interest in having erected, maintained and protected on the banks of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and their tributaries and the by-passes and overflow channels and basins mentioned herein, good and sufficient levees and embankments or other works of reclamation, adequately protecting the lands overflowed or subject to overflow by said streams, . . . and it shall be the duty of the reclamation board at all times to enforce on behalf of the State of California and the people thereof the erection, maintenance and protection of such levees ... as will, in their judgment, best serve the interests of the State of California. The purposes and objects of this act are to carry into effect the plans of. the California Debris Commission with such modifications and amendments and such additional plans as have been or may hereafter be adopted by the reclamation board for the control of the flood waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and their tributaries and said basins and to vest in said reclamation board control and jurisdiction over said plans.”

We then have an institution, a state agency, created by the state, under the exclusive control and management of the state, administered by officers appointed by the Governor of the state, and engaged in an enterprise of state-wide concern— the act itself providing that “The State of California and the people thereof are hereby declared to have a primary and supreme interest” in its objects and purposes.

[5] But, aside from these considerations, we think the act of January 30, 1919, is neither more nor less than an act authorizing the state board of control to invest state money in the warrants duly and regularly issued under the act precisely as that board may now and has been since its organization authorized by law to invest state funds in United States and state bonds, municipal bonds, school district bonds, highway and irrigation district bonds. The state has simply added another class of securities in which the board of control may invest state funds. The fact that an appropriation of moneys made to meet the anticipated purchase, in this particular instance, does not affect the power of the legislature to make the appropriation or the power of the board to make the investment. The act specifically provides for the payment of these warrants out of assessments, when collected, and when paid, the money goes back into the state treasury just as it would upon payment of any of said bonds purchased by the board of control.

In no view of the ease can we see that either the legislature or the board of control has exceeded its authority. The demurrrer is overruled and it is ordered that the peremptory writ prayed for be issued.

Burnett, J., and Hart, J., concurred.