Sefton

The suit is for partition of the land described in the complaint, and by an interlocutory decree there was awarded to plaintiff and to defendant, as successor in interest of Henry Roach, deceased, to each an undivided one-half of the land. The defendant appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying her motion for a new trial.

It appears from the findings and the stipulation of facts appearing in the bill of exceptions that, August 8, 1891, the land in question was vested in the plaintiff, who on that day conveyed to Henry Roach an undivided one-half interest therein; and on the same day a contract in writing was executed between Sefton and Roach, wherein, after reciting that the parties “are the owners one-half each” of the property in controversy, occurs the following:

It is claimed by the appellant that under and by virtue of this agreement Roach “acquired and became vested of a first and prior interest in and to (the land in controversy) to the extent of two thousand dollars over and above an undivided one-half interest therein, and that in equity and good conscience there should first be allotted and set apart to these defendants sufficient of said above-described…