Lord

This action was commenced for the recovery of $330 alleged to be due from the defendants to plaintiff (assignee of Remington Cash Register Co.) under a contract of conditional sale of a Remington cash register. The original price was $375, $45 was paid and the balance was payable at the rate of $20 per month. The contract provided that in case of default “the purchase price of said register, less any actual payments thereon, shall at once become due and payable; ...” The contract further provided that the Remington Cash Register Company, or its agent, may, if it so elect, “take possession of and remove said register without legal process and retain as rental for the use of said register while in the possession of the undersigned all payments theretofore made.” Said contract also provided that “the register shall remain your property until the price, or any judgment for the same is paid in full.”

It appears from the record that the cash register in question was delivered to the defendants, who were doing business under the firm name and style of Windsor Square Grocery Company, and that thereafter upon a sale of the business of the Windsor Square Grocery Company from the defendants…

I concur in the judgment. Appellants’ principal contention is that the Remington Company, by resuming possession of the cash register, elected to terminate the contract, and thereby lost its right to maintain an action on the contract, to recover the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Even in the event of a completed sale of personal property, where a vendee, to whom title had passed, abandoned the property and exposed it to dangers arising from the absence of protection, it was held that although the vendor might have left to its fate the property so abandoned, yet he was not required to follow any such hazardous and unreasonable course. Under the stated circumstances, although the vendor took the property into possession, this act did not amount to an election of remedies, and did not deprive the vendor of his right to an action on the contract. (Phillips V. Stark, 186 Cal. 369, 374 [ 199 Pac. 509 ].) Notwithstanding that the present action arises out of a conditional sale contract, I think that the same rule applies here.

I concur in the opinion herein as expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Conrey.