Bickerstaff

An information was filed against the defendant in the superior court of the county of Humboldt, state of California, wherein he was accused of the crime of selling alcoholic liquors in no-license territory, the particular allegation being "that heretofore, to-wit, on the 29th day of July, A.D. 1919, the said J. A. Bickerstaff within the boundary of said 'no-license' territory, in supervisorial district number two, at and in the county of Humboldt, state of California, did willfully, knowingly and unlawfully, sell, furnish, distribute and give away alcoholic liquors, to-wit: beer and which was not so mixed with other drugs as to prevent its use as a beverage, to one William McKay." After trial had the defendant was convicted, and from the judgment pronounced upon the verdict he prosecutes this appeal. The appellant calls attention to many matters occurring during the trial which he claims were error and prejudicial to his rights. We deem it not necessary to state all of them, and in deciding the case shall only discuss those that seem to be of the most importance. [1] The prosecution was had under the so-called Wyllie Act, [Stats. 1911, p. 599]. In construing said act the court…

An information was filed against the defendant in the superior court of the county of Humboldt, state of California, wherein he was accused of the crime of selling alcoholic liquors in no-license territory, the particular allegation being “that heretofore, to-wit, on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1919, the said J. A. Bickerstaff within the boundary of said ‘no-license’ territory, in supervisorial district number two, at and in the county of Humboldt, state of California, did willfully, knowingly and unlawfully, sell, furnish, distribute and give away alcoholic liquors, to-wit: beer and which was not so mixed with other drugs as to prevent its use as a beverage, to one William McKay.”

After trial had the defendant was convicted, and from the judgment pronounced upon the verdict he prosecutes this appeal.

The appellant calls attention to many matters occurring during the trial which he claims were error and prejudicial to his rights. We deem jt not necessary to state all of them, and in deciding the case shall only discuss those that seem to be of the most importance.

[1] The prosecution was had under the so-called Wyllie Act, [Stats. 1911, p. 599], In construing said act the court…

The petition for rehearing is denied. We think it necessary to say, however, that we do not approve of all that is said in the opinion of the district court of appeal on the subject of the instructions given and refused.

[8] The opinion appears to approve the pernicious practice sometimes indulged in by the trial courts of repeating, over and over again, instructions couched in varying, language, but embodying the same principle of law. This is especially prevalent with regard to instructions relating to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the degree of proof required of the prosecution. Repetitions of this character are not necessary and should be avoided as far as possible. Several of the instructions criticised in this case were given, in effect, in other instructions using somewhat different forms of expression but having the same meaning. The trial judge should take care to give to the jury, once in clear language, every principle of law applicable to the particular case. When he has done this, he is not required to repeat any of them, no matter how many separate instructions are asked which may include them. Such continual repetition tends to give undue…