Delucchi
People v. Delucchi
Opinion
lead Opinion
By information the district attorney of Amador county charged the defendant with the crime of an assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, and the court thereupon imposed upon him a fine in the sum of $600, "and in default of the payment of said fine that he be imprisoned in the county jail of Amador county, California, one day for each two dollars of said fine until said fine is satisfied." This appeal is from the judgment and the order refusing the defendant a new trial. The points urged against the judgment and order are that the court erred in refusing to give to the jury certain instructions requested by the defendant and in its rulings permitting certain questions to be asked defendant on his cross-examination. The evidence, briefly epitomized, developed the following facts: The defendant and the prosecuting witness, one Manuel Lopez, prior to the day on which occurred the difficulty bringing about this prosecution, had worked together at the "Little Amador Mine," situated near Amador City, in the county of Amador, the first named being a "shift boss" and the last named an…
addendum Opinion
We are satisfied with the conclusion reached in the former opinion in this case. We think, as announced therein, that the court's charge clearly and correctly covered every important question arising upon the evidence, and do not think that it has been or can be shown that any different *Page 110 verdict would have followed from the giving of the special instructions proposed by the defendant and rejected by the court. But we may not improperly here say, lest a misapprehension may arise from our criticism of the instruction given by the court based upon subdivision 3 of section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure — that a witness false in a material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others — that we did not intend to be understood as intimating that it was our opinion that an instruction announcing that proposition in the language in which it was expressed by the court would be prejudicial in any case, whatever the facts and circumstances thereof might be. The instruction obviously involves the statement of a mere commonplace or the statement of a proposition which every person of common sense knows or ought to know. Indeed, he would be radically deficient…