Humphry

I concur in the judgment. The questions involved in the case are: Whether the court below had jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction; and whether, assuming it to have jurisdiction, there was error in dissolving it. On the first point the majority of the court are of the negative opinion, and this view is supported by some of the early cases. (Natoma Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544 ; Hicks v. Michael, 15 Cal. 117 ; Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 265 ; Natoma Co. v. Parker, 16 Cal. 83 .) But, unless it is to be supposed that the court was unaware of the force of its expressions, the later cases are, I think, to be understood as affirming the rule that in all cases “the dissolution or continuing in force of a preliminary injunction is a matter largely within the judicial discretion of the ° court below,” and that “the settled rule in such eases is that the court will not interfere with the action of the lower court unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Parrott v. Floyd, 54 Cal. 535 , citing De Godey v. Godey, 39 Cal. 166 ; McCreery v. Brown, 42 Cal. 457; Rogers v. Tennant, 45 Cal. 186 . And, see, also, Payne v. McKinley, 54 Cal. 533 ; County of Yuba v. Cloke, 79 Cal. 239 , [ 21…

I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Allen, and will add the following: The preliminary injunction was granted after notice. Section 532 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: “If an injunction be granted without notice, the defendant at any time before the trial, may apply, upon reasonable notice, to the judge who granted the injunction, or to the court in which the action is brought, to dissolve or modify the same.” It seems to me that this language means that, if an injunction is granted after notice, it cannot be dissolved until after or upon the trial of the ease upon its merits. This construction of the statute has been clearly recognized in the following decisions of the supreme court: Natoma Water etc. Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544 ; Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 260 ; Natoma Water etc. Co. v. Parker, 16 Cal. 83 . The last- of these cases is referred to with approval in Curtiss v. Bachman, 110 Cal. 439 , [ 52 Am. St. Rep. 111 , 42 Pac. 910 ], wherein it is said: “As the preliminary injunction was granted upon notice to the defendant, and after hearing thereon, the proper course for the defendant to take was to appeal from the order, and the court in all probability…

Appeal from an order dissolving a temporary injunction. The temporary injunction, restraining the sale of certain corporate stock delinquent on account of nonpayment of an assessment, granted “until the further order of the court, ’ ’ was so granted upon notice, and upon the hearing of which affidavits of defendants and a certain certificate in relation to the diminution of the number of directors, together with the complaint, were considered by the court. Thereafter, a general demurrer was sustained to the complaint and leave given plaintiff to amend. Thereafter a stipulation was entered into that, without the formality of notice, a motion should be made to dissolve the injunction, “upon the ground that the defendants’ demurrer to the complaint on the ground that said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, has been sustained. Said motion will be made upon the pleadings and papers on file herein and on said order, subject to plaintiff's objection that a motion to dissolve cannot now be made.” At the time agreed upon for the hearing of the motion, and within the time given plaintiff to amend her complaint, she presented and filed an amendment…