The assessed valuation of a portion of plaintiff’s ranch in San Diego County, as determined by the county assessor, was raised by the hoard of equalization of the county in July, 1929, after a hearing on the matter of which plaintiff had due notice. The raise in assessed valuation increased plaintiff’s taxes $20,479.25. Under written protest as provided in section 3819 of the Political Code, plaintiff paid all its taxes for the year 1929-30 and brought suit for a refund of $20,479.25. It alleged the action of the board of equalization was illegal and void. Defendant county duly answered, the action was tried without a jury, and judgment was for the plaintiff, from which defendant appeals.

The findings show that Tax Factors, Inc., pursuant to an agreement with the board of supervisors, made a survey and valuation of all real property located within San Diego County and filed with the hoard a series of schedules showing their appraised values, which schedules included the lands of the plaintiff. That prior to July 1, 1929, the county assessor, in the preparation of his assessment-roll for the fiscal year 1929-30, placed a valuation of 40% of the value fixed by the report of Tax Factors, Inc., on all the real property in the county. That on the 15th of July, 1929, the board of supervisors, sitting as a board of equalization at a regular meeting of which plaintiff had notice, adopted the following resolution:

That after some discussion among the members of the board, the resolution, with this addition, was unanimously adopted. Following this action, or early in the morning of the 16th of July, 1929, the board of equalization duly and regularly adjourned as a board of equalization for the year 1929. That pursuant to the foregoing resolution the assessment-roll was amended on or about. July 17, 1929, to show the valuations fixed by the board of equalization on the parcels of land_specified therein; that the assessments or valuations so entered on the assessment-roll were supplied and furnished to the deputy county assessor making the entries by one Richard W. Miller, a person then in the employ of the board of supervisors. Finding YII further holds:

The remaining findings of fact and conclusions of law will be set out verbatim.

“IX.

“That thereafter, and subsequent to said 17th day of July, 1929, and subsequent to said adjournment of July 15, 1929, of said Board of Equalization for the year 1929, said Board of Supervisors on, to wit, July 22, 1929, without notice to the plaintiff of its intention then and there so to do, and without any notice to the plaintiff, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, held a meeting and transacted business as a Board of Equalization, and at such meeting passed and adopted, as a Board of Equalization, a resolution reading as follows:

The theory of plaintiff’s case is that the action of the assessor was legal bnt that the action of the board of equalization in adopting the resolutions of July 15, 1929, and July 22, 1929, is illegal, because the evidence shows that the board by its action attempted to reassess the property; that they delegated to another person the powers which the board alone is authorized to exercise; that the evidence ■shows that the plan of the board of equalization was to reassess the property without regard to the assessed value of like lands similarly situated; that they assessed against plaintiff, property not listed on the assessment-roll; and that, as stated in respondent’s brief, the changes made in the assessor’s figures, “pursuant to the direction of the resolutions, result in wholesale discriminations among like properties similarly situated, so considerable (in some instances where the parcels are contiguous) as to shock one’s sense of justice and conception of equality and to make the inference irresistible that the discrimination is the result of ‘unfairness and oppression, either through design or through such gross error or negligence as to amount to the equivalent of fraud. ’ ”

Defendant contends that neither the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action nor does the evidence prove one. It appears that the Rancho Santa Margarita, up to' the time of the assessment in question, had never been accurately surveyed. It had been assessed for many years by arbitrary sections established by “Guesswork”. No map of the rancho, arbitrary or otherwise, was in the assessor’s office. In the past the owners had acquiesced in this method of assessment and admitted that no owner knew just how many acres there were in the entire rancho. The portion involved here comprised about 17% miles of land along and adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The number of acres shown in these fractional sections bordering on the ocean, on the 1929 assessment-roll differ from the number of acres shown in these same sections on the map made by Tax Factors, Inc. It is admitted by appellant that “the assessor used the Tax Factor valuation of these fractional sections as found by Tax Factors, but did not correct his roll to show the number of acres in each fractional section as found by the Tax Factors.” Consequently some of the fractional sections included in the resolution of July 15, 1929, contain a larger acreage than appears on the. assessment-roll, as made up by the assessor. It is also admitted that three fractional sections were included in the resolution which were not upon the assessment-roll. It is conceded by appellant that inequalities do exist by reason of the raise in assessed valuation of this land, but that such inequalities, when compared to the large quantity of land covered by the resolution of the board of equalization, are insufficient to sustain a charge of fraud against the board and render their action void.

It is a fundamental rule that a tax, to be valid, must be equal as to its burdens and uniform as to its operation. Property must be assessed according to a just and uniform standard of value and the rate must be levied uniformly. In considering the validity of a revenue law it is immaterial whether the inequality or lack of uniformity in the levy is the "result of design, accident or inadvertence.

“What the taxpayer is entitled to is the exercise of good faith and fair consideration on the part of the taxing power in assessing his property, at the same rate and on the same basis of valuation as that applied to other property of like character and similarly situated. Inequality of taxation is produced as surely by inequality of valuation as by inequality of the rate of tax.” (Birch v. County of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 741 [ 200 Pac. 647, 649 ].)

Referring to the last paragraph of the resolution of the board of equalization of July 15, 1929, we find: “That the proper authorized official be and is hereby .authorized to make such computations and adjustments as will be necessary to conform to the order as above set forth, and apportion the amounts to the various sections listed as hereinabove set forth, in accordance with the arable lands suitable for subdivision, as they may appear upon the records of the classification of such lands as prepared for this Board by Tax Factors, Inc.” Appellant urges that this reference only required certain mathematical calculations for the clerk to make the changes ordered on the assessment-roll because all the evidence and records were before the board of equalization at the hearing. Respondent contends that the board of equalization did not determine the amount to which the assessment would be increased in each of the 40 sections affected, but delegated this power to one Richard W. Miller to exercise his own judgment and discretion respecting the amount of arable lands and the amounts suitable for subdivision purposes in each of the sections concerned. Mr. Miller was a civil engineer employed by the board of supervisors as their agent on the contract of Tax Factors, Inc., to see that the specifications covering the work were properly executed. He had also been made a deputy county assessor. He testified that he made the computations referred to in the last paragraph of the resolution of July 15, 1929, not at the request of the county clerk or any deputy county clerk, but pursuant to this resolution which he had assisted in preparing. How he made these computations and arrived at the figures which he entered on the assessment-roll therefore becomes material. Referring to his testimony we find he only used the classification plats of Tax Factors, Inc. On these plats the soil types were shown but no reference was made to arable lands or lands suitable for subdivision purposes. As to the first paragraph of the resolution dealing with definite sections (Zone 1) he testified that although section 6, T. 11 S., R. 5 W., was not included in the assessment-roll, he did apportion a part of the increase of $208,640 covering Zone 1 to this section. Taking up next the third paragraph dealing with definite sections (Zone 3), he stated that although sections 22 and 25, T. 9 S., R. 7 W., were not shown on the assessment-roll, yet they were included in the apportioning of the increased assessed valuation amounting to $80,008 for this zone. His testimony as to the second paragraph of the resolution dealing with definite sections (Zone 2) shows that in figuring the increase in valuation as to section 29, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., he figured on 640 acres at $46 an acre when the assessment-roll shows for this section 629 acres. For section 30, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., the assessment-roll shows 576.7 acres and he figured the increase of $46 per acre on 590 acres. For section 31, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., the roll shows 195 acres and the increase of $46 per acre he figured on 251 acres. For section 4, the roll shows 148% acres and the increase was figured on 210 acres. For section 10 the roll shows 191.75 acres and the increase of $46 per acre was figured on 320 acres. Section 14, the roll shows 268 acres and the increase was figured on 365 acres. Section 24, the roll shows 250.5 acres and the increase was figured on 490 acres. Section 23, the roll shows 3.6 acres and the increase was figured on 22 acres. In Zone 1, there were 72 acres in section 9 of T. 11 S., R. 5 W., known as the Tidal Marsh, and he figured the $64 per acre increase on the 72 acres because he felt it was suitable for subdivision purposes. In Section 13-9-7 (Zone 3), although it was listed as containing 252 acres of arable land on the plat, yet he figured the increase of $58.40 per acre on only 68 acres because he felt only the lands adjacent to the coast line were to be included, i. e., only those lands which he felt were subject to the “coast influence”. Quoting his testimony:

The appraised value placed by Tax Factors, Inc., on non-tillable washouts throughout the county was $2 an acre, so that the assessed valuation fixed by the county assessor of forty per cent thereof would be 80 cents an acre. Rough broken land was appraised by Tax Factors, Inc., at $5 an acre which would therefore have a uniform assessed valuation throughout the county of $2 an acre. Irregularities also appear as to sand dunes, creek lands and a lagoon, all uniformly assessed throughout the county at $2 an acre, which were assessed at a rate of $48 an acre.

The evidence therefore conclusively shows that the assessed valuation of portions of the land in question was increased by Richard W. Miller, relying upon the classifi cation plats of Tax Factors, Inc., and Ms individual knowledge, judgment and discretion as to arable lands and lands suitable for subdivision purposes, through the action of the board of equalization in referring the matter to him by their resolution of July 15, 1929. Furthermore the method followed of increasing the assessed valuation by a certain amount per acre without regard to value of land nullified the equalization as between the sections.

Taxation of real property is a very serious matter, and a fair, just and uniform method must be followed in raising or lowering the assessed valuation of lands in a county. We feel that the evidence in this action supports finding XI of the trial court that the valuations fixed through the resolution of the board of equalization were ‘ ‘ discriminatory, lacking in uniformity and illegal”. A portion of the resolution of July 15, 1929, to wit, Zone 4, was rescinded by the resolution of July 22, 1929, because of being too indefinite and not capable of identification. After reviewing all of the evidence, we must concede that there was evidence to justify the trial court in concluding that the board of equalization had agreed upon some definite system or plan to raise the assessed valuation of respondent’s land by a definite amount per acre. Without question, the method employed does not display an attempt to equalize and make uniform the assessed valuations of these lands with like property similarly situated. No matter what the evidence may have been before the ' board of equalization, we have before us the method adopted upon which to base the increase of the assessed valuation. Officials may act honestly and in good faith and yet where their method of increasing assessed valuations shows serious discriminations and a lack of uniformity, their action will be deemed equivalent to fraud.

”... while it was not claimed that there was any actual fraud or corrupt intent on the part of the officials making and sustaining the assessment in question, there was, nevertheless, such a violation of plain duty on the part of such officials as to constitute ‘fraud’ or ‘something equivalent to fraud,’ within the meaning of those terms as used in the decisions relative to the review of the action of assessing officers, entirely regardless of the motive actuating them in the matter of such an assessment.” (Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 198 Cal. 388, at 397 [ 245 Pac. 189, 193 ].)

Under the aforegoing statement of the law we therefore hold that the evidence sustains the finding of the trial court that the action of the board of equalization resulted in inequalities of taxation constituting “fraud” or “something equivalent to fraud”, as those terms have been used in the decisions relating to the action of assessing officers the boards of equalization.

The judgment is affirmed.

Barnard, P. J., and Marks, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on October 20, 1932.