Criminal Law—Sale op Dairy Cows Without Notice to Mortgagee or Buyer—Sufficiency of Information.—In this prosecution for the sale of twenty-five dairy cows without informing the buyer of the existence of a mortgage on the cattle or the mortgagee of the intention to make the sale, the information was sufficient and set forth the particular facts of the offense charged.

Id.—Identification of Animals by Other Means Than Brands.—In such prosecution the mortgagee may be permitted to give testimony as to the identification of the cattle sold by other marks in addition to the brand on them.

Id.—Payment of Mortgage Subsequent to Sale—Evidence.—Evidence in such prosecution tending to show that the mortgage was paid by transactions occurring subsequently to the sale, and that ultimately the mortgagee did not lose anything by the defendant’s acts in diminishing thex security, was properly excluded.

Id.—Subsequent Sale by Mortgagee—Evidence.—An objection to a question propounded to the mortgagee as to what cattle he was preparing to sell at a time prior to the sale by the defendant, was properly sustained.

Id.—Declaration by Mortgagee—Admissibility in Evidence.—Objection was properly sustained to a question propounded to the mortgagee as to a statement made by Mm that he had not lost anytMng on the defendant and would not lose anytMng on him.

Id.—Subsequent Payment op Mortgage—Whether a Defense.—Payment of the mortgage, after the commission of the offense, did not constitute any defense to the prosecution.

Id.—Elements op Offense—Right op Mortgagor to Sell—Agency.— Section 538 of the Penal Code, defining the offense in question, requires that in making a sale of mortgaged chattels the mortgagor must, at or before making the sale, inform the prior mortgagee in writing by giving the name and place of residence of the party to whom the sale is to be made, and that he must also inform the purchaser of the existence of the prior mortgage. Therefore the defendant had a right to sell his cattle without permission of the mortgagee, by giving the information as required by law, and no question of agency was applicable to the transaction.

Id.—Accommodation Mortgage—Sale by Mortgagor—Evidence.—If the defendant claimed that the mortgage was made for accommodation and did not represent a real debt, the prosecution was entitled to inquire of the defendant concerning other transactions preceding the execution of the mortgage and apparently inconsistent with his testimony about an alleged debt owing from the mortgagee to Mm at the time of the execution of the mortgage.

Id.—Application op Penal Code in Case op Accommodation Mortgage. The claim of the defendant that the mortgage was given “for accommodation” implies that the note and mortgage were made to be pledged or otherwise used in some business transaction, and the maker of such a mortgage is no more excused from observing the provisions of the Penal Code than is the maker of any other chattel mortgage.

Id.—Instruction as to Credibility op Witnesses—Refusal to Give— Harmless Error.—The refusal to give an instruction, for the most part following the language of section 1847 of the Penal Code, as to the credibility of witnesses, was not prejudicial, if instructions are given which substantially cover the same ground.

Id.—Reasonable Doubt—Intent to Defraud—Refusal of Instruction.—The court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that in order to convict the defendant they must be morally certain not only that the defendant sold to the persons mentioned in the information, and at the time and place therein stated, one or more of the cows described therein, but they must be satisfied to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold and delivered such cow or cows “with the intent in him to defraud” the mortgagee.

Id.—Intent to Defraud in Selling Mortgaged Property—Whether an Essential Element op Crime.—That part of section 538 of the Penal Code which refers to the selling of mortgaged personal property does not make the intent with which the act was done an indispensable element of the offense; and when intent is not made an affirmative element of a crime, the law imputes that the act knowingly done was with criminal intent, and it need not be alleged nor proved.

Id.—Information—Clause Charging Intent—Disregarding as Superfluous.'—If the information, charging the owner of mortgaged cattle with selling them without informing the buyer of the mortgage or notifying the mortgagee of the intended sale, alleges that the defendant’s acts and omissions were “with intent to defraud” the mortgagee, this clause may be regarded as superfluous, and proof of such acts and omissions on the part of the defendant carries with it a necessary implication of intent to defraud both the mortgagee and -the purchasers of the mortgaged property.