Sichterman

Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and from a judgment entered thereon the defendant has appealed. In his complaint the plaintiff charged negligence in general terms following the pleading of the plaintiff in Stein v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 368 [ 113 P. 663 ]. In its answer the defendant denied any negligence on its part and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In its opening brief the defendant contended that it was not negligent and quoted from the record to sustain the contention. It also contended that the plaintiff was negligent and quoted from the record to sustain that contention. Furthermore, as stated above, it made the contention that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in giving an instruction on the doctrine of the last clear chance. When the plaintiff filed his brief he quoted no part of the record refuting the contentions made by the defendant, but merely addressed himself briefly to citing some authorities on the question of imputed negligence and some on the subject of the doctrine…

The petition for rehearing is denied.

In his brief the plaintiff did not specify any act of defendant claimed to be negligence. In his petition for a rehearing plaintiff asserts that the defendant violated the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 113 of the Motor Vehicle Act (1 Deering’s Gen. Laws 1923, p. 1886), and that defendant failed to use ordinary care. (Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308 [ 237 Pac. 1066 ].) The statute relied on refers to places “when the driver’s view is obstructed.” In this case there is no evidence that the driver’s view was obstructed. The statute relied on limits speed to fifteen miles “in traversing” an intersection. To traverse means “to pass across, pass over, cross in traveling.” (Cent. Diet.) As defendant traversed the intersection the *492 record wholly fails to show that he did so at a speed of fifteen miles or more.

In his petition the plaintiff states that the driver of the truck ‘ ‘ admits that when he entered the intersection of the two streets he was traveling at a speed in excess of that allowed by law; and he admits that he saw and realized then that a collision was inevitable if he did not stop; and admits that at the speed he was…

Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and from a judgment entered thereon the defendant has appealed.

In his complaint the plaintiff charged negligence in general terms following the pleading of the plaintiff in Stein v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 368 [ 113 Pac. 663 ]. In its answer the defendant denied any negligence on its part and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In its opening brief the defendant contended that it was not negligent and quoted from the record to sustain the contention. It also contended that the plaintiff was negligent and quoted from the record to sustain that contention. Furthermore, as stated above, it made the contention that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in giving an instruction on the doctrine of the last clear chance. When the plaintiff filed his brief he quoted no part of the record refuting the contentions made by the defendant, but merely addressed himself briefly to citing some authorities on the question of imputed negligence and some on the subject of the…