Lamattina

The defendant was charged by information filed in the superior court of Merced County by the district attorney of said county with the crime of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder. He was convicted of the cripne of assault with a deadly weapon, and prosecutes this appeal from the judgment and the order denying him a new trial.

The sole point upon which the defendant relies for a reversal is that judgment of sentence was not pronounced within the time prescribed by the statute, and that, therefore, by the terms of the statute, it was the imperative duty of the trial court to grant him a new trial.

The record shows that the verdict of the jury was rendered on the thirteenth day of September, 1917, at which time the court fixed Monday, the 17th of September, as the time for pronouncing judgment. On the day last named, the defendant made an application for probation, and thereupon the court ordered that the matter of probation be referred to the probation officer of the county. The district attorney then stated that the probation officer thought he would require approximately three weeks within which to make a proper investigation and file his report and…

In petitioning for a rehearing of this case, counsel for the defendant declares in his petition that in our former opinion we failed to consider and pass upon the point—the principal and controlling point in the case—that where judgment is not pronounced in a criminal case within the time limited by section 1191 of the Penal Code, the defendant is entitled to a new trial without regard to whether he has or has not consented to the delay.

It is further stated in the petition: “We again point out that in the case at bar a motion for a new trial was made which was not determined within fifteen days after verdict of guilty.”

We thought that in our original opinion both the above-stated propositions were quite fully considered and a decision thereof arrived at and announced. In the hope of making ourselves clearer to counsel, however, we will here repeat what therein we held, as we still hold, that, under the ruling in' the case of Rankin v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 189 , [ 106 Pac. 718 ], probation having been applied for in this case by the defendant, the trial court was authorized to pronounce judg-' ment of sentence at any time within twenty-five days after the date of the…