De Vries v. De Vries

The single question submitted on this appeal, which is prosecuted from an order or decree denying the petition of the appellant for a decree of partial distribution of the estate of William H. De Yries, deceased, is whether the remainder to said appellant, provided for by the fourth clause of the last will and testament of said deceased, is vested or contingent.

The court below, two of the judges thereof presiding at the hearing and concurring in the conclusion therein reached, held the remainder so devised to the appellant, Marion De Vries, to be contingent.

The decision of the question presented here must, obviously, rest on the intention of the testator, and, in turn, such intention must be gathered from an interpretation of the language of the last will and testament of the testator.

The language of said testament particularly pertinent to this inquiry reads:

The contention of the appellant is that, under the terms of said will, that portion of the estate so devised to him vested in him, by virtue of the provisions of section 694 of the Civil Code, immediately upon the death of the testator.

Reproduced in the transcript on appeal is the written opinion of the learned…