Ronald G. Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Company
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Kilkenny, J.
This appeal presents a classic example of the wilderness in which courts sometimes find themselves when searching for solutions to problems arising under the judicial nightmare known as Conflict of Laws.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this appeal, the fundamental facts are undisputed. Appellant, a resident of the state of Washington, owned an airplane manufactured and sold by appellee in the state of Kansas in 1967. In January, 1972, appellant’s pilot flew the aircraft from Spokane to Yakima and thence on toward Seattle. During the leg of the flight between Yakima and Seattle, the pilot noticed the odor of what he thought was an electrical fire. On the approach to *610 the landing field near Seattle, he discovered he was unable to lower the landing gear, either through activation of the electrical primary system or through use of the manual back-up system. After checking the aircraft manual and talking to a mechanic on the ground, all to no avail, the pilot again attempted to activate the manual landing gear, at which time the chain mechanism broke. Subsequent to exhausting all means of lowering the gear and after consultation with the tower, the pilot decided…
Concurring Opinion
Sneed, J.
(concurring):
I concur in the opinion. I should like, however, to add that in my opinion Oregon courts would reach the same result even if a true, as opposed to a false, conflict existed. That is, Oregon courts, upon finding a real conflict between the law of Kansas on the one hand and the laws of Oregon and Washington on the other, very likely would find that Washington had the most significant relationship with the accident and the parties involved.
I say this because the appellant is a resident of Washington and, more importantly, Washington is the place of the accident. Emphasis is laid on the place of the accident, not because of the wistfulness with which I regard those simple days in which the place of the tort rule governed these matters, but because I feel certain that Oregon would recognize that strict liability in tort primarily reflects a policy to provide compensation to those injured as a result of defective products rather than to deter improper conduct. The primacy of the purpose to provide compensation to victims in my judgment irresistibly swings the pointer of “most significant relationship” to the state of the accident. See George v. Douglas Aircraft, 332…
Concurring Opinion
Wollenberg, J.
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached by Judge Kilkenny, but I think the case presents a true conflict situation which should be resolved in the manner suggested by Judge Sneed in his concurring opinion. My reading of McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625 , 400 P.2d 1018 (1965), and La Prelle v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 85 F.Supp. 182 (D.Kan.1949), convinces me that Kansas would apply its own substantive law if this action were brought in a Kansas forum. Since Kansas does not recognize strict liability as a basis for recovery, Kansas would refuse *615 to apply the conflicting law of either Oregon or Washington. Judge Sneed’s discussion of the relevant policy considerations persuades me that his is the most sensible resolution of the conflict.
Opinion
520 F.2d 608 Ronald G. FORSYTH, Appellant. v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Appellee. No. 73-2544. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 26, 1975. David P. Templeton (argued), Portland, Or., for appellant. James H. Clarke (argued), Portland, Or., for appellee. OPINION Before KILKENNY and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge. * KILKENNY, Circuit Judge: 1 This appeal presents a classic example of the wilderness in which courts sometimes find themselves when searching for solutions to problems arising under the judicial nightmare known as Conflict of Laws. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 For the purposes of this appeal, the fundamental facts are undisputed. Appellant, a resident of the state of Washington, owned an airplane manufactured and sold by appellee in the state of Kansas in 1967. In January, 1972, appellant's pilot flew the aircraft from Spokane to Yakima and thence on toward Seattle. During the leg of the flight between Yakima and Seattle, the pilot noticed the odor of what he thought was an electrical fire. On the approach to the landing field near Seattle, he discovered he was unable to lower the landing gear, either through activation of the electrical…