Lauman

I dissent.

I agree with the contention of the attorney-general that sections 1191 and 1202 of the Penal Code, as amended in 1909, have no application so far as the time within which judgment must be rendered after the reversal of an order arresting judgment is concerned. It is true that the purpose of the amendment is to secure expedition in the disposal of cases and that the conclusion announced by the district court of appeal would tend to expedite proceedings after reversal, but as the provisions refer specifically to the remedies and the sequence of and the time within which they may be availed of after plea or verdict of guilty and no reference is made to proceedings after reversal, I think there is no statutory warrant for the construction given to the amended provisions.

The remedies provided in section 1191 which have any pertinency here are the motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment, which must be decided within fifteen days after plea or verdict, and an application for probation for the determination of which the court is allowed twenty additional days, and, on motion of defendant, this may be extended to ninety days.

In this ease the first two of the remedies…

Appellant was convicted of a felony, it being charged that he presented false proofs of loss under a policy of fire insurance. He presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and then made a motion in arrest of judgment, which motion was granted. Upon an appeal taken by the people the supreme court reversed the order arresting the judgment. (People v. Lauman, 187 Cal. 214 [ 201 Pac. 459 ].) Remittitur certifying the judgment of the supreme court was received and filed in the trial court on the 14th of November, 1921. Defendant had been released on bail and a bench-warrant was issued to bring him into court. Upon information received by his attorney that such warrant had been issued, defendant surrendered himself into custody and appeared before the court on November 21st with his counsel. At that time his counsel presented the objection that, under the provisions of sections 1191 and 1202 of the Penal Code, no sentence could be pronounced, but a new trial should be ordered because more than five days had elapsed from the date of the verdict of the jury. The court stated that he could not hear the argument at that time, owing to the fact that another cause was on trial,…