Reed

This is a contest of the election of defendant to the office of mayor of the city of San Diego, on the ground of ineligibility. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1111, subd. 2.) The special ground assigned is that at the time of the election “the defendant held and now holds an office in the army of the United States, to wit, the office of first lieutenant of infantry . . . retired with the rank of captain,” etc. The principal question involved in the case is whether the position of the defendant as retired officer is a “lucrative office” within the meaning of section 20, article IV, of the constitution of this state; or, rather, whether it is an “office,” for, if so, it is undoubtedly lucrative. The court held that the case came within the application of the constitutional provision, and judgment was entered annulling and setting aside the defendant’s election. The appeal is from the judgment.

The provision of the constitution referred to, and the provisions of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, pp. 885-889) referring to retired officers, are as follows:

By subsequent statutory provisions, cited in respondent’s brief, retired officers may be detailed also…