Habeas Corpus—Conviction under City Ordinance—Laundry Forbidden in Building Used for Public Store.—The proprietor of a laundry or wash-house, convicted of the violation of a city ordinance forbidding the maintenance thereof in the city limits in any building used in part for a public store, is not entitled to be discharged upon habeas corpus.

Id.—Constitutionality of Ordinance—Province of Court—Doubt Insufficient—Clear Proof of Invalidity Required.—It is not sufficient that the court may entertain a doubt as to whether the legislative body has exceeded its constitutional authority, but it must clearly appear that some fundamental right of the individual has been invaded and a personal privilege impaired or destroyed, before an ordinance duly enacted can be declared invalid.

Id.—Nature of Police Power—Discretion of Legislative Body— Presumption of Proper Action.—The police power vested in a municipality is of extensive application, involving many variant circumstances. It is incapable of exact definition, and depends for its just and proper exercise so largely upon knowledge of local conditions, that a very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative body, clothed as it is with the presumption that it will be guided by a rational and conscientious regard for the rights of the individual, as well as for the interests of the community.

Id.—Duty of Courts in Considering Local Police Power.—-In determining the validity of the ordinance, under the police power, the courts must give due consideration to all the circumstances of the particular city as far as disclosed, the objects sought to be accomplished, and the necessity which exists for the measure. It is only where it appears that the legislation has no proper relation to the public welfare, and that under the guijse of police regulation, attempt is made to violate personal or property rights, that the courts will not hesitate to overthrow the measure.

Id.—Local Restrictions upon Particular Lawful Business.—The fact that an ordinance imposes restrictions upon the laundry business which are not imposed on other lawful avocations, and that the laundry business is a common, ordinary and useful avocation, which should be hampered as little as possible, and that it is not a nuisance per se, does not render local restrictions thereon invalid, where such lawful business, when conducted in particular localities specified, may become dangerous to the public safety or health.

Id.—Ordinance General and not Discriminative.—The portion of the ordinance complained of by the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is general in its application, and does not discriminate against him as an individual or as a member of the Mongolian race. All persons, without regard to race or condition, are subject to its penalties if they violate its provisions.

Id.—No Prohibition of Proper Calling—Begulation—Presumption. The ordinance discloses on its face no prohibition of the exercise of a proper calling, but only a regulation thereof, which this court must presume that the evidence before the city council demonstrated to be in furtherance of a beneficent design to contribute to the welfare and public health of the community.

Ib.—Provision of Ordinance Involved not Invalid upon Its Face.— It is only in eases where an ordinance appeared to be invalid upon its face that its invalidity has been necessarily declared. It is held that here it cannot be affirmed that the provision of the ordinance in controversy goes beyond the legitimate domain of the police power, or that the method adopted is unreasonable and unnecessarily oppressive.