Houser

This matter comes before this court on a writ of certiorari to review an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, adjudging the petitioner to be in contempt of court, for having violated a restraining order issued in connection with an order to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not be granted in the case of Skillington v. Melberg et al., then pending in the Superior Court.

On August 3, 1931, a temporary restraining order was granted upon an order to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not be granted and a bond was filed on granting of the temporary order. By stipulation, the hearing on the order to show cause was continued from August 10th to August 12th. On August 12th the order to show cause was heard, both parties being represented,— petitioner here being one of the counsel in said proceeding,—and the matter was then submitted for decision. On August 13th, the court entered its minute order granting an injunction pendente lite upon plaintiffs filing an additional bond of $1,000. On August 18th such bond was filed, and on August 19th, the formal order of injunction was signed and filed. However, on August 18th, after the filing of the…

I concurin the judgment. The decisions relied upon by petitioner are not, in my opinion, sufficient to sustain his position. I will here refer to the cases cited by him, except that I omit those which I think are not at all in touch with the question here to be decided. In Cohen v. Gray, 70 Cal. 85 [ 11 Pac. 508, 509 ], the court allowed a restraining • order, together with an order to show cause why an injunction should not be gr'anted, and thereafter granted an injunction pendente lite. On appeal from the second injunction order the Supreme Court remarked that “upon the entry of that order, the restraining order spent its force”. It is clear enough that the court was not attempting to fix the precise moment when the restraining order would be succeeded by the injunction pendente lite, for that was not a matter of question in the ease. The same observation applies to Curtiss v. Bachman, 110 Cal. 433, 439 [ 52 Am. St. Rep. 111 , 42 Pac. 910, 912 ], where it was said that “the restraining order made at the commencement of the action would expire by its own terms at the hearing of this motion”. In Maier v. Luce, 61 Cal. App. 552 [ 215 Pac. 399, 400 ], it was shown that the superior…

I concur in the judgment. Not only am I in accord with the reasoning presented by each of my associates, but in addition thereto, I am impelled to an identical conclusion from a consideration of the particular duty which an attorney owes to the court.

In the instant ease, with full knowledge on the part of petitioner of the existence of the temporary restraining order, but in reliance upon what as to him amounted at most to a bare technicality, he deliberately chose to violate the order. Concededly the trial court had jurisdiction in the premises; and until vacated or other legal proceedings were had which might result in the order being set aside, such order should have been treated as binding and in full force and effect, especially by an attorney at law whose bounden duty required him to maintain the respect due to courts of justice (subd. 2, sec. 282, Code Civ. Proc.), and to refrain from disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court (subd. 5, sec. 1209, Code Civ. Proc.).

In the case of Territory v. Clancy, 7 N. M. 1108 [ 37 Pac. 1108 ], it is held (syllabus) : “An attorney counseling his client to disregard the order of a court, upon the technicality…