Plaintiffs commenced the action to enforce certain service liens against the real property belonging to defendant Central Forest Company. These liens consist of two classes: 1. Labor performed; and 2. Liens for appliances, teams, and power furnished and supplied.

The trial was by the court without a jury and plaintiffs had judgment, from which defendant Central Forest Company appeals.

Appellant states in its closing brief that “since the brief was prepared the laborers have been paid and the judgment has.been satisfied so far as it affects the laborers. ’ ’ Appellant asks that the judgment be reversed as to plaintiffs J. A. Davis and Eldon E. Thwaites, whose claims fall under the second class above referred tó.

Section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows:

It is alleged in the complaint “that at all times herein mentioned, the defendant; J. S. Westphal was the contractor, agent and representative of the defendant, Central Forest Company, a corporation, in the work and construction under the contract hereinaftjer mentioned, and represented defendant, Central Forest Cpmpany, in that behalf.

“That on the 15th flay of May, 1914, said defendant J. S. Westphal, made and entered into a contract with the defendant, Central Forest Company, a corporation, to do the farm development, consisting of plowing, preparation of soil, leveling, checking, ditching, draining and building roads, under and pursuant to the terms and specifications of said contract, in and upon the above described land, the property of the defendant, Central Forest Company, a corporation; that said contract was in writing and subscribed by the parties thereto, and the same was filed for record in the office of the county recorder of the county of Glenn, State of California, the same being the county in which said property is situate, a copy of which said contract is hereto annexed, marked Exhibit ‘A,’ and made a part of this complaint.

“That the said defendant, J. S. Westphal, contractor and agent of and for said defendant, Central Forest Company, a corporation, commenced the building and construction of said farm development under and pursuant to the terms and conditions of said contract, and under and pursuant to the specifications and plat thereof attached, on or about the 18th day of May, 1914, and continued said work until on or about the 1st day of September, 1914.”

The specific purpose for the development of appellant’s tract of land was so to prepare it that it could be seeded to alfalfa and could be readily and economically irrigated. It will be perceived from the provisions of the contract, some of which will presently be stated, that the work to be done constituted a permanent improvement to the land; installed thereby a permanent system for utilizing it for greater profit and greatly increasing its productive capacity, and added to its value certainly at least the contract price for the work, which was $24 per acre. The character of the work and the necessity for its being carefully planned and supervised by a competent engineer will be seen from the contract itself, under which the work was done, some of its provisions being as follows:

The testimony of plaintiff Davis was that the contractor, Westphal, hired from him fifteen mules with their equipment of harness, stretchers, lines, and other appliances—a complete outfit ready to be used and which was used in the development work being done by Westphal under his contract with the defendant corporation. The mules rented to Westphal by plaintiff Thwaites were similarly equipped and so used by the contractor, “grading and scraping and all the development work.”

In their reply brief respondents, we think, fairly described this work and its purpose as follows: “When the farm de yelopment was finally complete its component parts constituted a unified structure, arranged, built, and constructed of earth, with ditches and laterals built from the source of water supply to convey the ¡water to the farm development and with laterals to distribute the water over the land. At regular intervals on the farm development there were cheeks (small embankments of earth) thrown up parallel to each other for the purpose of holding the water on the parts or portions of the farm development desired; thus, the land between any two of these checks could be irrigated separately and independently of any other uhit of the farm development. The land between the cheeks was required to be level transversely with a continuous slope longitudinally, so as to insure the successful operation of the irrigation system, and in order to comply with the contract. Thus, when the alfalfa in any one unit had been sufficiently irrigated, gates in the lower end of the unit were opened and the water was automatically taken from the unit and removed by gravity away from the farm development. This could be] done without interfering with the irrigation of the other units of the system. The land lying between the checks, or small embankments, consisted of specially leveled and highly prepared and cultivated seed beds, and it was in these beds that the alfalfa seed was planted. It is thus readily apparent that the farm development was an entity, consisting of integra^ component parts, each part of which was necessary and vital to the successful operation of the whole. ’ ’ ¡

We are called upon to decide whether the phrase “or other structure,” as used in section 1183, supra, may safely be said to apply to a completed undertaking such as was contemplated by this contract.

The court made the following among other findings of fact:

The court also made the following finding as conclusion of law: ‘‘That the farm development erected upon the lands of the Central Forest Company, as aforesaid, constitutes and is a structure within the meaning of section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California.”

In Williams v. Mountaineer Gold Min. Co., 102 Cal. 134 , [ 34 Pac. 702 , 36 Pac. 388 ], Mr. Justice Temple, speaking for the court, construed these terms as follows: “The use of the phrase ‘other structure’ in the above extract (from section 1183) shows that the word ‘structure’ comprehends all the properties specifically enumerated, and is broad enough to include any similar thing constructed, should the enumeration prove incomplete. ’ ’ The definition found, in volume 27, Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, second edition, page 191, is as follows: “In the broadest sense a structure is any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner; any construction.”

What was said in Caddy v. Rapid Transit Co., 195 N. Y. 415 , [30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 30, 88 N. E. 747 ], we think quite true, namely: “In eases like this lexicographers’ definitions are useful as guide-posts, but they do not take us to our destination. The statutory meaning of a word or phrase must be gathered from the purpose for which the law containing it was enacted. ”

In the present case, we think, the definition given by Judge Temple, supra, will lead us to our destination. The statute gives the lien to all persons “furnishing materials to be used or consumed in or furnishing appliances, teams and power contributing to the construction, . . . either in whole or in part, of any building, wharf, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct, well, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road or other structure . . . for the value of such labor done and materials furnished and for the value of the use of such appliances, teams or power, whether at the instance of the owner, or of any other person acting by his authority, ’ ’ etc.

The farm development here contemplated was a finished piece- of work composed of integral parts-, some of which the statute expressly designates as structures, and when completed consisted of ditches, drains, embankments, roads, so correlated as to form one harmonious entity designed to accomplish a particular object and constituting a permanent and valuable improvement to the land and necessary to its highest and most profitable u^es. When finished, it stood out as obvious and visible in its usefulness and its purpose as would a house, or barn, or any other of the structures enumerated in the statute. Viewing the statute with that liberality with which we are not only authorized, but by the statute itself we are enjoined to regard it, we feel no hesitancy in holding with the learned trial court that the work to which plaintiffs contributed, as shown, constituted a structure.

Appellant’s contention that the only section of the code applicable is section ¡1191 and that as plaintiffs have not brought themselves strictly within that section, they are without remedy by way of lien and must look alone to the contractor, we do not think maintainable. If, as we think, they have shown that the improvement or farm development toward which they contributed teams for the power necessary to its accomplishment constituted a structure, they had a right to ’ look to section 1183 for relief.

The judgment is affirmed.

Hart, J., and Burnett, J., concurred.

A petition to have .We cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the 'district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on July 15, 1918.