Whiting

Plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant to obtain a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Defendant in his answer denied the charge and filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff, charging both cruelty and desertion. The court denied relief to either party.

The defendant appeals from the judgment and maintains that the charge of desertion set forth in his cross-complaint was fully established by the evidence in the ease, and that the decree should have been in his favor on this issue. He makes no complaint as to the decree denying him a divorce on the ground of cruelty. The sole question, therefore, on this appeal is whether, on the evidence in the ease, defendant was entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion.

In support of his contention that the decree should have been in his favor, defendant’s counsel, in his brief, makes copious quotations from the testimony of the defendant. In fact, by far the greater portion of his brief is taken up with such quotations of testimony. He then argues that this evidence constitutes a complete case under the law of this state relative to desertion. We might agree with the defendant in this contention,…