Kirby

This is an application for a writ of mandate against the county treasurer of Merced County, to compel him to pay a warrant to plaintiffs for work, etc., done under a contract with the board of supervisors, amounting to the sum of $1687.50.

The case comes up on the judgment-roll, and the facts appear to be as follows:—

On June 6, 1903, petitioners entered into a contract with the board of supervisors to install a heating plant in the county hospital, then in course of erection, for the sum nC $2,250, to be paid as follows: On July 31st, seventy-five per cent of the cost of all labor and material then furnished. Other payments were to follow in like manner.

On August 15th petitioners entered into another contract with said board to install in said building a ventilating plant for which petitioners were to receive $3,988. On September 17, 1903, petitioners presented a demand against Merced County in due form and duly verified, which claim or demand is as follows:—

This claim was allowed September 21, 1903, the county warrant issued and presented to the county treasurer for payment on September 24th, and indorsed “not paid for want of funds.” On December 11, 1903, it was again…

Application for rehearing. We have gone carefully over our opinion rendered herein, and reviewed the facts in the ease, and considered the matters suggested in the petition herein, and can see no reason for granting a rehearing.

If true as alleged that the heating contract was extended and made a part of the ventilating plant, and plaintiff was to have $2,250 for the heating plant and $3,988 for the ventilating plant, making $6,238 for both contracts, and it having received two thousand dollars thereon, or on either of the contracts, there would remain due from the county the sum of $4,238. And still we do not pass upon the validity of either contract.

We are still of the opinión that the findings support the judgment rendered in the court below.

Rehearing is denied.

McLaughlin, J., and Chipman, P. J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court after judgment in the district court of appeal was denied by the supreme court on December 4, 1905,