The decedent left a holographic will in words and figures as follows:

Thereafter, August 5, 1932, she filed an account showing total receipts of $16,915.91, disbursements $5,846.34 and personal property on hand $11,069.57. With the account she filed a petition for final distribution in which she set forth:

St. Paul’s English Evangelical Lutheran Church, one of the legatees, appeared and filed written objections to the petition for distribution. The court made a decree which, among other things, provided as follows: “ . . . and orders distribution thereof as follows:

From that decree the surviving daughter appealed. She contends the trial court erred in holding the words “personal property” as used in the last sentence were used in a restricted sense and meant “personal effects”. She quotes section 106 of the Probate Code and she quotes from In re Brown’s Estate, 119 Cal. App. 195 , at page 197 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 319 ], as follows: “The intent of the testator must be determined, if possible, from the language of the will. (Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 344 [ 55 Pac. 1011 ]; Fay v. District Court of Appeal, 200 Cal. 522, 536 [ 254 Pac. 896 ].) The authorities are uniform in declaring that: ‘ “The purpose of construction as applied to wills is unquestionably to arrive if possible at the intention of the testator, but the intention to be sought for is not that which existed in the mind of the testator but that which is expressed in the language of the will.” It is not the business of the court to say in examining the terms of a will, what the testator intended, but what is the meaning to be given to the language which he used. ’ (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 459 [ 108 Pac. 287, 291 ].)” The respondent replies that it admits the rules stated, but says there are other rules which must also be considered. It then presents several arguments each based on different assumptions. In the first place, it assumes that the testatrix knew when she wrote her will that her real estate was of a value of only $4,200; that she also knew the minimum costs of administration would amount to $2,052.39. Subtracting those costs from $4,200 would leave $2,147.61 to pay $3,700 in specific bequests. Again it says that if we deduct $3,646.34, the actual costs of administration, not counting depreciation of real estate, from $4,200, the value of the real estate, there is left $553.66 to pay $3,700 in legacies. In either event the appellant’s construction would entirely cut out the rights of her brothers to receive anything. Furthermore such construction operates to render nugatory every part of the will except the last clause. The respondent then asserts that a construction which gives effect to every provision of the will is preferred to one which will render some provisions inoperative. (Probate Code, sec. 102; Estate of Robinson, 159 Cal. 608 [ 115 Pac. 49 ].) These contentions of the respondent we think are well founded. Furthermore, as the respondent contends, we see no violation of the provisions of section 106 of the Probate Code. That rule commands us to take the words of the will “in their ordinary and grammatical sense. ...” The trial court did so. Because the statute defines the words “personal property” the appellant contends that the statutory definition is the ordinary meaning. In that assumption she begs the question. The words “personal property” have many meanings. “Although popularly the term personal property is used in a somewhat restricted sense to include only goods and chattels, tangible things, the subjects of personal use, in its broad and general sense it includes everything which is the subject of ownership not coming under the denomination of real estate; ...” (50 C. J. 760.) The broad meaning happens to coincide with the statutory definition. When under such circumstances a court is construing the meaning of a will it will not be confined to an examination of the meaning of the words used in one particular sentence without regard to other sentences contained in the will. But it will consider all of the sentences and when possible give some force and effect to each one. (Probate Code, sec. 103.) That rule is peculiarly applicable to a holographic will. (In re Stratton, 112 Cal. 513, 519 [ 44 Pac. 1028 ].) In the case entitled Estate of Ladd, 94 Cal. 670 , at page 674 [ 30 Pac. 99, 101 ], the court quoted with approval as follows: “The different parts of a will, or of a will and codicil, shall be reconciled, if possible, and where a bequest has been once made, it shall not be revoked, unless no other construction can be fairly put upon the language used by the testator. (Citing cases.) ” In the case entitled Estate of McCauley, 138 Cal. 432 , on page 434 [ 71 Pac. 512 ], the court takes up the same subject and cites many authorities to the same effect. The decision in Estate of Koch, 8 Cal. App. 90 [ 96 Pac. 100 ], is helpful but not closely in point in the instant case. Our attention has not been called to any case in this state that is directly in point. The respondent cites Stender v. Stender, 181 Mich. 648 [ 148 N. W. 255 ]; Gist v. Craig, 142 S. C. 407 [ 141 S. E. 26 ]; In re Moore’s Estate, 241 Pa. 253 [ 88 Atl. 432 ]. All of those cases are directly in point and support the contentions of respondent.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.