Kieffer

The appellant has filed a petition for a rehearing.

It is again urged that physical contiguity of different parcels of land is not necessary to entitle the owner in a condemnation proceeding to severance damages and that the statement to the contrary in Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 399 [ 153 Pac. 705 ], is dictum. The appellant in that case had insisted in the trial court “that the physical separation was negligible because unity of use and not physical contiguity was the controlling factor.” The trial court held adversely to this contention. In affirming the judgment the supreme court held that unity of use was not the controlling factor and, after quoting from section 1248 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to severance damages, said: “This very language limits in *261 terms the award of damages to the property taken and the resultant damages to contiguous property injured by severance of the property taken.” This language is not. dictum. “ Where there are two grounds, upon either of which the judgment of the trial court can be rested, and .the appellate court sustains both, the ruling on neither is obiter; but each is the judgment of the…

The defendant Kieffer, who will he referred to as the defendant, has appealed from the judgments in three separate proceedings in eminent domain. The three cases were consolidated for trial and tried together.

The plaintiff district includes within its boundaries the principal cities on the easterly shore of San Francisco Bay. For the purpose of providing a water supply for these cities the plaintiff selected a reservoir site, referred to by the parties as the Lancha Plana site, on the Mokelumne River, with the object of impounding the waters of that stream. Northerly and over a ridge from the Lancha Plana site is another reservoir site, referred to as the Arroyo Seco site. The plaintiff was granted a license by the federal power commission to construct and operate its proposed dam and reservoir and it acquired some of the lands in the reservoir site. Prior to the commencement of these suits the defendant had acquired title to large areas of land in both the Lancha Plana and the Arroyo Seco sites and options to purchase other lands in both sites.' He had also acquired title to all but a small parcel of a strip of land connecting the larger areas owned by him in the two reservoir…

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 242 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 243 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 244 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 245 The defendant Kieffer, who will be referred to as the defendant, has appealed from the judgments in three separate proceedings in eminent domain. The three cases were consolidated for trial and tried together. The plaintiff district includes within its boundaries the principal cities on the easterly shore of San Francisco Bay. For the purpose of providing a water supply for these cities the plaintiff selected a reservoir site, referred to by the parties as the Lancha Plana site, on the Mokelumne River, with the object of impounding the waters of that stream. Northerly and over a ridge from the Lancha Plana site is…