In this appeal we are unfortunate in not having the assistance of a brief on behalf of respondents, the record before us consisting of the clerk’s transcript of some 125 pages, a reporter’s transcript on appeal consisting of approximately 450 pages, and a brief by the appellants Kranz and Municipal Bonding Company only. A record of such size presenting technical questions of engineering and intricate problems of law should not be thus lightly cast upon the court. An issue presented to a court justifies the co-operation of both court and counsel. We have endeavored, however, to acquaint ourselves with the facts of the case and the law involved in this appeal.

The City of Redondo Beach, a municipal corporation, instituted proceedings under the provisions of the “Improvement Act of 1911” for the construction of a pier. The work was completed by the contractor and thereupon an assessment was made and filed by the superintendent of streets of the City of Redondo Beach, and a hearing was had thereon as provided by law. At the hearing certain property owners presented appeals to the city council in which they contended that the pier was in certain instances not in accordance with the plans and specifications for the improvement. The council, however, accepted the work as done by the contractor and confirmed the assessment.

Thereafter three of the appealing property owners filed suit to enjoin the collection of these assessments, the issuance of bonds thereon, and to declare all proceedings null and void and to set aside the lien of the assessment on the ground that the improvement as constructed did not conform to the plans and specifications thereof, the action being brought by the three plaintiffs on behalf of all of the property owners of the district.

At the trial the plaintiff's introduced in evidence the transcript of the testimony taken before the city council at the time of the hearing of the appeals, and also introduced additional evidence over objection of defendants, of a different character than that offered and received by the city council at the time of the hearing of the original appeals. It also appeared at the trial that the lien of the plaintiffs herein had, previously to the trial of this action, been paid and released.

At the termination of the trial the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, declaring that the proceedings initiating the improvement were null and void for the reason that the resolution of intention and notice of improvement did not properly describe the improvement and that the assessment issued for the improvement did not constitute a lien upon the property of plaintiffs nor of others located within this assessment district, and defendants were enjoined from taking steps to collect the assessment and from applying for a reassessment to cover the expenses of the work.

The first question to determine is whether or not the resolution of intention and notice of improvement were sufficient -under the provisions of the Improvement Act of 1911. Section 3 of the Improvement Act of 1911, as amended (Stats. 1923, p. 106), reads in part as follows:

Turning now to the resolution of intention and notice of improvement we find the description of the work set forth as follows:

The description as given in the resolution of intention and notice gives the starting point of the pier, which is fixed and definite, the courses in which the pier is to run, its general form and the termination, which is also a fixed and definite location. Also is given in general terms the kind and class of materials of which the pier is to be constructed, and refers to the plans and specifications for further particulars.

It is well settled that considerable latitude is to be allowed under section 3 of the act, and no contention is made that the plans and specifications are not sufficient in every detail to show the design and construction of the improvement, and the notice and resolution refer specifically to these plans and specifications and tell where they may be seen and examined.

In Walsh v. Swanson, 64 Cal. App. 587 [ 222 Pac. 190 ], the court said:

To the same effect is the case of Federal Construction Co. v. Kneese, 37 Cal. App. 659 [ 174 Pac. 694 ], in which the rule is thus expressed:

It therefore appears that the resolution of intention and the resolution ordering the work and the notice of improvement are sufficient within the meaning of the statute and the city council acquired jurisdiction thereby.

The next point urged for reversal is that the court erred in admitting extrinsic, additional and different evidence and expert testimony than that presented before the council regarding the alleged variations between the improvement as constructed and the plans and specifications adopted.

At the hearing before the board some three hours were consumed in the taking of testimony on the protest to the acceptance of the improvement, and some six or eight witnesses examined. At the trial before the superior court occupying four days, ten witnesses were sworn and examined, among whom were only one or two who had testified before the board. An examination of the testimony taken before the board indicates that additional and different evidence was offered and received by the trial court, all over the timely objections of counsel.

The legislature has confided to the board of trustees or the governing body charged with the duty of initiating and performing the specific improvement, the duty of determining whether or not the work has been performed according to the contract, and that body having decided upon conflicting testimony is conclusive. Its act is an exercise of a qiiasvjudicial power and cannot be attacked collaterally by any of the parties thereto, unless the proceedings are absolutely void.

In the case of Lambert v. Bates, 137 Cal. 676 [ 70 Pac. 777 ], the court passing upon an order of the town council of Berkeley, in overruling certain objections to the work, said:

The Supreme Court has recently had under consideration the Improvement Act of 1911, in the case of Hannon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251 [ 5 Pac. (2d) 4, 6 ], where it again plainly lays down the rule enunciated above. It is there determined also that the board had wide plenary powers in order that they may have latitude in matters of discretion for the definite reason that in determining the question of compliance with improvement contracts discretion is necessary from the very nature of the work, and official efficiency requires that their hands be not too tightly bound.

“When an appeal has been taken to the council its decision may be attacked in a legal proceeding only upon pleading and proof that the board acted fraudulently or that its action is so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to raise an inference of plain abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” (Hannon v. Madden, supra.)

The allegation in the instant case is “that said city council arbitrarily, 'unreasonably, and fraudulently denied said appeals, accepted said work and confirmed the assessment as presented to the Superintendent of Streets”.

This is not a sufficient pleading of fraud. “Fraud must be pleaded in specific language descriptive of the acts which are relied upon to constitute the fraud. It is not sufficient to allege it in general terms or in terms which amount to mere conclusions.” (Hannon v. Madden, supra.) The finding by the court was “that the council in denying the appeals and objections of plaintiffs and confirming said assessment, abused its discretion to such an extent as to amount to constructive fraud upon the property owners within the assessment district”. Neither the allegations in the complaint nor the proof support this finding nor is a finding of constructive fraud an issue for the trial court; that being a matter to be determined only from" the record of the proceedings before the original tribunal. (Rutledge v. City of Eureka, 195 Cal. 404 [ 234 Pac. 82 ].)

The foregoing being determinative of the appeal we do not pass upon the other points urged by appellant, which probably will not again arise if the matter is tried anew.

The judgment is reversed.

Plummer, J., and Thompson, J., concurred.