We concur and dissent.

We concur in the foregoing opinion in sustaining the judgment of conviction of Tetta Stromberg, and in the conclusion reached that the judgment of conviction of all appellants under the second count of the information cannot be sustained.

We dissent from the order reversing their convictions under this count without directing the trial court to grant their motion for new trial.

This prosecution was instituted under section 403a of the Penal Code which provides as follows:

As the judgments against all of the defendants under the second count of the information must be reversed, leaving only the conviction of Tetta Stromberg under the first count to be considered, we will hereafter refer to her as the appellant.

The camp at which the red flag was displayed, was established on a ranch near Tucaipa several miles from Red-lands in San Bernardino County. This camp provided board and lodging for children. It was promoted, organized and managed by a camp conference, which was composed of four delegates from each of six groups, most of which were affiliated with the Communist Party. This party has been functioning for some time as a political party under the name of the Workers (Communist) Party. In his brief, appellant’s counsel describes her as follows:

The red flag which was displayed at the camp and which the children saluted, and to which they pledged their allegiance under the guidance and direction of appellant, was the flag of the Communist Party, as well as the flag of Soviet Russia.

A library was maintained at the camp under the charge of appellant. A number of the exhibits taken therefrom bore appellant’s name, some in her own handwriting, and on others her name appeared in the writing of an undisclosed person. She admitted ownership of a number of them.

Appellant’s contention that section 403a of the Penal Code is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an unwarranted limitation on the right of free speech guaranteed to the people by the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of California, deserves serious consideration. She directs her argument to the phrase in section 403a of the Penal Code; “of opposition to organized government.” If opposition to organized government were the only act prohibited by this section we might be forced to agree with appellant. “Opposition” is a word broad in its meaning. It has been defined as follows:

It might be construed to include the peaceful and orderly opposition to a government as organized and controlled by one political party by those of another political party equally high minded and patriotic, which did not agree with the one in power. It might also be construed to include peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal means and within constitutional limitations. Progress depends on new thought and the development of original ideas. All change is, to a certain extent, achieved by the opposition of the new to the old, and in so far as it is within the law, such peaceful opposition is guaranteed to our people and is recognized as a symbol of independent thought containing the promise of progress. It may be permitted as a means of political evolution, but not of revolution. This section, however, goes further than prohibiting opposition to organized government, and forbids the display of any flag, badge, banner or device “as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.”

The words “anarchy” and “sedition” have well defined meanings, and the teaching of anarchy and sedition as understood by the laws of our land can well be prohibited by a constitutional statute. Webster’s Dictionary defines an anarchist as follows r

The same authority defines anarchy as:

Black’s Law Dictionary, second edition, at page 68 defines an anarchist as:

In Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345 [13 L. R. A. 864, 28 N. E. 692 ], the court said:

In Lewis v. Daily News Co. of Cumberland, 81 Md. 466 , [29 L. R. A. 59, 32 Atl. 246 ], the court said:

In People v. Most, 36 Misc. Rep. 139 [ 73 N. Y. Supp. 220, 222 ], the court said:

It is, therefore, clear that when section 403a of the Penal Code prohibís a display of a red flag as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action it prohibits acts which have a well-defined and well-settled meaning in the law of our land, a teaching which, if allowed to be put into force and effect, would mean revolution in its most dreaded form.

The section in question also prohibits the display of a red flag as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious nature. Black’s Law Dictionary, second edition, page 1067, gives the following definition of “sedition”:

So, also, in Wilkes v. Shields, 62 Minn. 426 [ 64 N. W. 921 ], the court said:

In the ease of Arizona Pub. Co. v. Harris, 20 Ariz. 446 [ 181 Pac. 373 ], “sedition” is defined as follows:

We therefore conclude that the term “sedition” and the word “seditious” have well-defined meanings in law. That the teaching of sedition against our government can be, and has long been prohibited, needs no further citation of authorities.

As we view the provisions of section 403a of the Penal Code, its prohibition of displaying a red flag “as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character” is certain, and a proper and constitutional and legislative enactment. It is not contrary to the provisions of either the state or federal Constitutions guaranteeing freedom of speech to our people.

The constitutionality of the phrase of this section, “of opposition to organized government” is questionable. This phrase can be eliminated from the section without materially changing its purposes. The section is complete without it and with it eliminated it can be upheld as a constitutional enactment by the legislature of the state of California.

“ Where only part of a statute is invalid for any reason, in order to render the whole statute void for the same reason, all of the parts thereof must be so interdependent as. that no one part may be eliminated without destroying the force of the whole statute; but where a statute is valid in one part, and invalid in another, the former part, if not dependent in any measure upon the latter, and can without the latter, accomplish one or all the material purposes of the act, will be sustained, and that which is void will be eliminated and disregarded. It follows that the court will not declare an entire act unconstitutional where the objectionable part can be eliminated without destroying the efficacy of the remainder. The effect of such partial invalidity will then be, that the independent provision, not in its nature and connections essential to the law, may be treated as a nullity, leaving the rest of the enactment, if it comprehend within itself an entire and complete scheme, to stand as valid.” (5 Cal. Jur. 644; Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors, 183 Cal. 434 [ 192 Pac. 40 ]; Hunt v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. 470 [ 173 Pac. 1097 ]; Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412 [66 L. R. A. 249, 77 Pac. 166 ]; Johnson v. Tautphaus, 127 Cal. 605 [ 60 Pac. 172 ]; Murphy v. Pacific Bank, 119 Cal. 334 [ 51 Pac. 317 ]; Christy v. Supervisors of Sacramento County, 39 Cal. 3 ; People v. Barbiere, 33 Cal. App. 770 [ 166 Pac. 812 ]; In re Mitchell, 19 Cal. App. 567 [ 126 Pac. 856 ]; Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367 [ 85 Am. Dec. 133 ]; Matter of Bonds of San Joaquin Irr. Dist., 161 Cal. 345 [ 119 Pac. 198 ]; McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57 [ 52 Am. St. Rep. 149 , 35 Pac. 418 ].)

Appellant next contends that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and is not supported by the evidence. She bases this contention upon three separate arguments; first, that the place in which the red flag was displayed was not a public place as the term is used in section 403a of the Penal Code. Second, that it was not a meeting place in the sense that the term is used in the same section; third, that the evidence admitted fails to prove that the red flag was a sign, symbol, or emblem displayed “as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action, or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character.”

A meeting place has been defined by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of Finnem v. State, 115 Ala. 106 [ 22 South. 593 ], as including a place in a woods half a mile from the public highway, where a number of persons meet for the purpose of engaging in a prohibited activity. The following cases are to the same effect: King v. Brown, 100 Tex. 109 [ 94 S. W. 328 ]; Farrell v. City of Opelika, 144 Ala. 135 [ 39 South. 249 ]; Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207 [ 60 S. E. 1082 ]; People v. Whitman, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1107 ; O’Mally v. McGuinn, 53 Wis. 353 [ 10 N. W. 515 ].

A “meeting” is defined by Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, third edition, volume two, as follows:

Bouvier defines an “assembly” as: “The meeting of a number of persons in the same place. An assembly of persons would seem to mean three or more. ’ ’

The evidence in this case shows that there were present at the camp at which the red flag was displayed, all of the defendants to this action, and a number of children, also that there were various adults visiting the camp at different times. The camp was situated upon a farm of about sixty acres, leased from the owner for the purpose of holding these assemblages. It was about one mile from the public highway and was reached by a private road. The flag was displayed each morning in the presence of the children. Under these facts we believe that it was displayed at a public place which was also a meeting place as we have heretofore defined the terms.

A casual reading of the exhibits before us containing quotations from literature found in the library at the camp which was admittedly under the control of appellant, convinces us that the red flag was raised “as an invitation and stimulus to . anarchistic action, and as an aid to propaganda that was of a seditious character.” We have selected at random three quotations from these pamphlets. They are as follows:

Again we read:

Lastly we quote as follows:

In reading the foregoing extracts from the literature at the camp we must bear in mind that appellant was on the committee which organized and had charge of the camp, that she was present each time the red flag was raised and led the children in the pledge of allegiance to the flag "and to the cause for which it stands,” and that the literature from which we have quoted, discloses the cause for which the red flag stands, a cause which advocates wholesale murder in the most terrible form of revolution. Under these circumstances there is more than ample evidence to sustain the conviction of appellant, Yetta Stromberg.

The judgment against all of the defendants, under the second count of the information, who have appealed to this court, is reversed, with instructions to the trial court to grant their motion for a new trial so that appropriate action under this second count may be taken in accordance with the conclusions we have reached herein.

The judgment of the conviction of the appellant, Yetta Stromberg, under the first count of the information is affirmed.

Barnard, Acting P. J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on July 7, 1930, and a petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the" District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on July 24, 1930.