Street 'Assessment—Separate Actions of Foreclosure as to Each Lot Assessed—Defendant Owning Several Lots.—Under the Street Improvement Act commonly called The Vrooman Act (Stats. 1885, p. 147), a separate cause of action for the foreclosure of the lien of an assessment for street work accrues as to each lot of land separately assessed under a single contract and assessment, notwithstanding the same person may own two or more of such lots.

Jb.—Joinder of Causes of Action—Separate Actions for Each Assessment.—While a plaintiff may unite such causes of action in one complaint, and is expressly authorized to do so by subdivision 8 of section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he is not required to do so, and a defendant cannot complain if the plaintiff brings a separate action as to each cause of action.

Id.—Consolidation of Actions—Statute Authorizing not Mandatory.—Section 1048 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that “whenever two or more actions are pending at one time between the same parties and in the same court, upon causes of action which might have been joined, the court may order the actions to be consolidated,” simply authorizes a court to consolidate such actions, when in its judgment, the interests of justice make it proper that a consolidation should be had. The word “may,” as used in that section, is not to be construed as the equivalent to the word “must.”

Id.—Discretion of Trial Court as to Consolidation.—Unless by statute consolidation is a matter of right, the trial court is vested with a discretion to consolidate or to refuse to do so, and the exercise of such discretion will not be reviewed except in a case of palpable abuse.

Id.—Refusal to Consolidate Actions—Trial of All Actions at One Time—Discretion not Abuse—Mandamus.—Where several actions had been brought against the same defendant to foreclose the liens of a street assessment against separate lots of land owned by him, which had been separately assessed under a single contract and assessment, and the same were at issue and ready .for trial, it cannot be held an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to consolidate the actions and to pursue the plan of trying all of them at the same time, where it does not appear that anything would be saved to the parties by the consolidation, so far as the costs, expenses, and trouble of trial and entry of judgment are concerned; and mandamus will not lie to compel the consolidation.

Id.—Effect of Consolidation—Plaintiff’s Right to Costs and Attorney’s Fee.—The consolidation of such actions would not have the effect of depriving the plaintiff, in the event of a judgment in his favor, of the right to recover legal costs already paid by him in each action,- or as to which his right had accrued, including the right to an attorney’s fee of fifteen dollars for each action, as provided in section 12 of the Vrooman Act (Stats. 1885, p. 157).

Id.—Attorneys’ 'Fees Recoverable for Each Action Commenced—Accrual of Right to Attorneys’ Fees.—The plaintiff’s right to the attorneys’ fees provided by section 12 of the Vrooman Act accrued in each action upon the commencement thereof, payable, of course, only in the event of a recovery by him. The trial court was without discretionary power in regard to this allowance, and could not deprive the plaintiff of the right thereto by a consolidation of the actions.