This is one of the “tide land cases,” so-called, decided by this court in a number of opinions filed at the same time, the first of the series being People v. California Fish, Co., 166 Cal. 576 , [ 138 Pac. 79 ]. In the present case a rehearing was ordered.

The opinion originally filed was prepared by Shaw, J., and read as follows:

The rehearing was ordered on the petition of San Pedro Lumber Company, which asked this court to pass specifically on its claim of prescriptive title, and on the question of its littoral rights. Although the first contention had not been advanced in the briefs, and the second was, as we thought, settled by the contemporaneous decision in People v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 166 Cal. 627 , [ 138 Pac. 103 ], the rehearing was ordered, for the reason, principally, that further consideration of the question of prescriptive title was deemed desirable.

Decisions rendered by this court since the rehearing was ordered dispense with the necessity of extended discussion of either of the questions thus presented. In Patton v. City of Wilmington, (L. A. No. 3485), ante, p. 521, [ 147 Pac. 141 ], filed March 4, 1915, it was held that a title to tide lands, which have been withheld from sale by the state, cannot be acquired by adverse possession. It is true that the justices joining in the decision differed widely in their reasons for this conclusion, but five of them united in declaring that, on one ground or another, a prescriptive title to such lands could not be acquired against the state. The court has thus finally repudiated the doctrine that a qualified title—viz., a title to the fee, subject to the public easements—may thus be acquired. This view had been declared in People v. Banning Co., (L. A. No. 3077) 167 Cal. 643 , [ 140 Pac. 587 ], and People v. Banning Co., (L. A. No. 3061) 167 Cal. 651 , [ 140 Pac. 591 ], decided at the same time as the California Fish Company case, but in each of these cases the judgment was vacated and a rehearing ordered. The two cases were subsequently disposed of upon stipulation of the parties, there being no decision upon the point now under discussion.

The claim of littoral' rights is met by a reference to Henry Dalton & Sons Co. v. Oakland, 168 Cal. 463 , [ 143 Pac. 721 ], where it is held, on the authority of People v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 166 Cal. 627 , [ 138 Pac. 103 ], that the owner of upland bordering upon navigable waters cannot assert an interest in the intervening tide lands, as against the right of the state or its authorized agencies to hold and control such tide lands in furtherance of the public uses of navigation and fishery. The decree here appealed from adjudged merely that the plaintiff is the owner of the tide lands in question, and that the defendants have no interest therein. This is a correct determination of the respective rights of the parties in such lands. Whether the owner of the upland may occupy the tide lands until the state, or its agency, sees fit to take possession of them in furtherance of some plan to aid navigation, or whether, when that time comes, the San Pedro Lumber Company will be entitled to compensation on account of structures erected by it on these lands, are questions that are not presented by the record before us, and that may well be left to be decided when they arise. (See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 , [ 138 Pac. 79 ].)

The opinion heretofore filed is approved as a correct determination of the points therein decided.

The order denying a new trial is affirmed. The judgment is modified as provided in said former opinion, and as so modified is affirmed, with costs to respondent.