A petition for hearing herein was

granted by this court after decision by the district court of appeal. A more thorough consideration, however, of the legal question presented in the petition has convinced us that the law of the case is correctly expressed in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Nourse of the district court of appeal. It is, therefore, adopted as the opinion of this court. It is as follows:

“ The evidence is without conflict and shows beyond question that the captain was killed while engaged in work entirely beyond the scope of his employment; that it was done without the knowledge or consent of the employer, and was not a ease of emergency which called the captain in his employer’s interest to go beyond the scope of his employment. The case is covered by the rule of Williamson v. Industrial Acc. Com., 177 Cal. 715, 718 [ 171 Pac. 797 ], where the Supreme Court say: ‘It would be an unwarranted extension of the statute to give it application to acts done without the knowledge or consent of the employer, which, however commendable from the viewpoint of loyalty to one’s employer, are not only outside of the employee’s specific employment and duty, but which are in themselves of such a hazardous character as that the employee ought not to be reasonably expected or required to do them. ’

“The same principle is stated in a different way by Schneider on ‘Workmen’s Compensation Law,’ volume 1, page 696, where it is said: ‘Notice must be taken that a factory of today usually includes within the field of its operations many fairly distinct lines of work, from that of the roustabout engaged in the ordinary labor that almost anyone may perform, to that of the expert mechanic, which can be done safely by those only with skill and experience. The difference between these various kinds of work was always recognized by the common law, and it was held to be negligence for the master to require of the servant, without warning and instructing him, the performance of work outside of and more dangerous than that which the latter had contracted to perform. Such classification of work exists in the very nature of things, and as much under the statute as at common law. Its recognition is required by any proper organization of a factory, not only for efficiency, but as well for the purpose of guarding against accident and injury. And if a workman, when there is no emergency, should of his own volition see fit to intermeddle with something entirely outside the work for which he is employed, he ought not to be allowed compensation upon the mere plea that he thought his act would be for the benefit of his employer. ’ ”

Our research has brought to light many authorities, other than those cited in the opinion of the district court of appeal, which tend to indicate the incorrectness of the award made herein by the respondent Commission. The following cases would seem to be pertinent: Losh v. Evans & Co., 5 W. C. C. 17, 19 T. L. R. 142; Wilson v. Dakota, L. & P. Co., 45 S. D. 175 [ 186 N. W. 828 ] ; Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 279 Ill. 11 [Ann. Cas. 1918B, 764, 116 N. E. 684 ] ; Mepham & Co. v. Industrial Com., 289 Ill. 484 [ 124 N. E. 540 ] ; Bischoff v. American Car & Foundry Co., 190 Mich. 229 [ 157 N. W. 34 ].

This court has upon earlier occasions recognized that an employee may go outside the sphere of his employment by doing work he was not engaged to perform. (Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 182 Cal. 612, 614 [187 Pac. 42]; Sherer & Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 175 Cal. 615, 618 [ 166 Pac. 318 ].) In our opinion, neither the evidence adduced before the respondent Commission nor any inference that might reasonably be drawn therefrom tends to in any manner support a finding that the injury resulting in the demise of the deceased was one “arising out of and in the course of the employment” or that the deceased was, at the time of injury, “performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment” or “acting within the course of his employment.” As we read the record herein it was no part of Captain Ough’s marine duties to repair the bent contact point referred to above. Such hazardous repair work was unmistakably and unquestionably within the range of duties of the line crew. The express instructions of the deceased’s employer required' that he communicate the necessity for such repair work to the line crew.

For the foregoing reasons it is ordered that the award of the respondent Commission be and the same is hereby annulled.

Rehearing denied.