Repeal of Statute Bending Litigation—Finality of Judgment.—As a general rule, when a cause of action is founded on a statute, a repeal of the statute before final judgment destroys the right of action, and a judgment is not final in this sense so long as the right of exception thereto remains.

Id.—Repeal of Statute After Judgment Becomes Final—Repeal Bending Appeal from Order Refusing New Trial.—Where a judgment has been affirmed on a direct appeal therefrom, and has by such affirmance become final during the existence of the statute supporting it, and has been in the process of execution within the law, and rights have arisen by virtue of such execution of the judgment, the repeal of the statute supporting the judgment, pending an appeal from an order denying a new trial in the action in which the judgment was rendered, without supersedeas or stay-bond, does not have the effect to destroy the judgment.

Id.—Effect of Motion for New Trial.—A motion for a new trial, in the absence of an order of the court to that effect, does not stay or suspend the operation of a final judgment. An action, under section 1049 of the Code of Civil Broeedure, is to be deemed pending while an appeal from the judgment is pending, or until the time for such an appeal has expired; but when the judgment upon appeal has been determined by an affirmance of the judgment, or when the time for appeal has expired, the judgment is admissible in evidence aa res adjudicate and to raise an estoppel in bar of the action.

Id.—Repeal Bending Appeal from Judgment.—When pending a direct appeal from a judgment, the law which alone will support it is repealed, the appellate court will not proceed further with the litigation, since it must pronounce a judgment and can pronounce it only under the authority of existing law.

Id.—Repeal Bending Appeal from Order Refusing New Trial.—In the case of appeal from an order refusing a new trial, where no stay has been granted and where the judgment has become a finality, the decision which the appellate court renders is not upon the judgment appealed from, but upon the order appealed from, and while the effect of its reversal of the order will be necessarily the setting aside of the judgment, this is but an incident of the ruling which it makes, which ruling goes not at all to the sufficiency or finality of the judgment, but only as to whether the judgment was fairly given.

Id.—New Trial Proceedings do not Suspend Judgment.—Under the system in this state, the appeal from an order denying a new trial is a separate and independent appeal, which, if prosecuted in time, may be taken after the judgment has become final. Excepting when ordered by supersedeas or permitted by stay-bond, it in no way suspends the judgment nor interferes with its finality.

Id.—Banking Act op 1903—Repeal After Final Judgment and Pending Appeal from Order Refusing New Trial.—Where a judgment rendered under the Banking Act of 1903, declaring a defendant bank insolvent and ordering it into involuntary liquidation, had 'been affirmed on direct appeal therefrom and thus become final, the subsequent repeal of such statute by the Banking Act of 1909, pending an appeal from an order refusing a new trial of the action in which the judgment was rendered, without supersedeas or stay-bond, does not have the effect to destroy the judgment, nor necessitate the dismissal of the action in which it was rendered.

Id.—Banking Act of 1903 is Constitutional.—The constitutionality of the Banking Act of 1903 is upheld, for the reasons stated in the opinion in People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 154 Cal. 194.

Id.—Evidence—Finding of Insolvency of Bank.—Upon a review of the evidence, it is held sufficient to sustain the finding of the insolvency of the defendant bank.