OPINION

This is an appeal from a judgment upon a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of having made false declarations before a United States grand jury in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970). We affirm.

Appellant’s alleged false statements to the grand jury came during its investigation into an attempted sale of stolen United States Postal Service bearer bonds. The facts surrounding the attempted sale were these: In the latter part of July, 1973, Claude Scallion approached William B. Smart and asked Smart if he could assist Scallion in the sale of some securities. On July 31, 1972, Smart introduced Scallion to Jon Zimmer, a broker with Shearson, Ham-mill & Co., Inc., in Beverly Hills, California. Scallion delivered Postal Service bearer bonds having a substantial face value to Zimmer and represented that they were owned by a Jack Bishop of Bakersfield, California. (Jack Bishop was, however, only the purported seller. His name was used to conceal the identity of the real seller.) Thereafter, in a routine investigation Zimmer discovered that the bonds were stolen and notified the F.B.I. Pursuant to a request by the F.B.I., Zimmer informed Smart that the transaction had gone through and that a check was ready.

Smart, however, became concerned and contacted appellant, who was a friend and business associate, to find out whether appellant knew anyone in the government with whom he could check to see if there was anything wrong with the bonds. On August 1, 1972, appellant called and had a telephone conversation with Postal Inspector Gerald K. Jones. At appellant’s trial Jones testified that appellant told him in that conversation that appellant had a wealthy friend in Bakersfield named Bishop; that Bishop was dying of cancer; that Bishop had placed something like $800,000 worth of postal bonds with Shearson, Hammill in Beverly Hills for sale; that following the placement of the bonds, the F.B.I. had been all “over the place”; that appellant had been a good friend of Bishop and did not want to see him get hurt; and that appellant asked Jones to cheek to determine if the bonds were stolen or if there were any difficulties with them. Jones testified that he thereafter checked through the Postal Service, found no indication that the bonds had been stolen, and so advised appellant.

Appellant was called before the grand jury on April 17, 1973, and asked questions about his knowledge of the attempted sale of the stolen bonds. On the basis of his testimony before the grand jury, appellant was indicted and charged with making false declarations before a grand jury in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1623 , which provides as follows:

The pertinent portions of the indictment were as follows:

Of appellant’s assignments of error, we need concern ourselves with only one: whether appellant’s statements to the grand jury fall within the rules enunciated in Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 , 93 S.Ct. 595 , 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973) and in United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1973) and 497 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1972).

In Bronston the defendant was sole owner of a motion picture production company, which petitioned for an arrangement with creditors under Ch. XI of the Bankruptcy Act. At a hearing held by a referee in bankruptcy to determine the nature and location of the company’s assets, the following questions were asked of Bronston and answers given by him:

As a matter of fact Bronston did at one time have a personal Swiss bank account *1028 but did not have one at the time he was testifying. His company did have a Swiss bank account at the time of Bronston’s testimony.

On the basis of his answer to the second question Bronston was prosecuted for perjury.

The government argued that ' Bronston’s answer to the second question implied that he never had a personal Swiss bank account and that his answer was therefore false. He was convicted and appealed.

In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court stated at 409 U.S. 360 , 93 S.Ct. 601 :

Bronston was held by this court to be controlling in United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1973).

In Cook the appellant was indicted for perjury for allegedly having made false statements to a grand jury during an investigation into gambling and racketeering in Seattle. Cook was tried and convicted of having given false testimony in his answers to the following questions:

His conviction was at first upheld by this court with Judge Ely dissenting.

In his dissent Judge Ely stated with particular reference to the first question:

Shortly after the original and dissenting opinions in Cook were issued in slip sheet form, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Bronston . This court recalled its opinions in Cook and remanded the case to the District Court for consideration in light of Bronston . The District Court did not, however, disturb the original judgment of conviction, and a second appeal followed. On that appeal this court reversed the conviction and stated at 489 F.2d 287 :

Thereafter, this court directed the publication of the original opinions in Cook “believing that they, when reviewed in connection with Bronston , may be of some worth to those concerned with the law of perjury in the federal courts.” Those opinions appear at 497 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1972).

In the instant case the questions asked of the appellant before the grand jury raise this problem: Did appellant under *1029 stand the word “seller” in the questions asked of him before the grand jury to mean “Jack Bishop” (the purported seller) or did he understand the word “seller” in those questions to mean that individual, unknown to him, who was the actual seller of the Postal Service Bonds? If appellant construed the word “seller” to mean Jack Bishop, his conviction must be affirmed. If he construed the word “seller” to mean that individual who was the actual seller of the bonds, then his conviction must be reversed.

A careful reading of the record has convinced us beyond any doubt that appellant knew that he was being asked about his knowledge of Jack Bishop when he was being questioned before the grand jury and that the word “seller” in the questions was understood by him to mean Jack Bishop.

Space forbids a detailing of all of the evidence that has persuaded us that appellant understood that he was being questioned before the grand jury about his knowledge of Jack Bishop. Our primary reliance is, however, upon the following:

1. At no time in the trial of this cause did appellant or his counsel contend that appellant did not know that he was being questioned about Jack Bishop before the grand jury. The whole thrust of the defense at trial was to pit the credibility of appellant against the credibility of Postal Inspector Jones and to try to persuade the jury that the testimony of appellant was to be believed and that that of Jones was to be rejected.

In the direct examination of appellant there was this exchange:

2. At no point in his final argument did defense counsel argue that appellant did not understand the questions being asked of him before the grand jury. Rather, he urged the jury to prefer the testimony of his client to that of Postal Inspector Jones. One excerpt from that final argument is illustrative:

3. The position taken by defense counsel. throughout the trial is set forth most clearly in his motion to set aside the jury verdict and to enter judgment of acquittal in which he stated:

4. Finally, in his opening brief on appeal in this court defense counsel stated:

And thereafter in his brief defense counsel stated:

By its verdict the jury obviously chose to believe Postal Inspector Jones and to disbelieve appellant. We believe that verdict to be amply supported by the evidence in this cause.

We have considered but found no merit in any of the other assignments of error made by appellant.

The judgment below is affirmed.