After further consideration, we are satisfied that our former opinion, written by Mr. Justice Tyler, upon the question involved in this appeal makes a correct disposition of that question. We, therefore, adopt so much of said opinion as deals with and is decisive of said question. It is as follows:

“ One of the objects of the reformed or code procedure is to simplify the pleadings and conduct of actions, and to permit of the settlement of all matters of controversy between the parties in one action, so far as may be practicable. And to this end most of the codes have provided that the defendant, in an action may, by appropriate pleadings, set up various kinds of new matter, or cross-claims, which must otherwise have been tried in separate actions. Generally speaking, in most of the states this new matter is broad enough to embrace all controversies which upon previous statutes might have been the subject of setoff, and all claims which under the adjudication of courts might have been interposed as defenses by way of recoupment, and secures to a defendant all the relief which an action at law, or a bill in equity, or a cross-bill would have secured on the same state of facts prior to the adoption of the code. The object of these remedial statutes is to enable, as far as possible, the settlement of cross-claims between the same parties in the same action, so as to prevent a multiplicity of actions. These cross-actions, however, are still distinct and independent causes of action, so that when properly interposed and stated the defendant becomes in respect to the matters pleaded by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant. (Francis & Bro. v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 271 ; Davidson v. Remington, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 310; Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y. 258 .) The same view has been taken by our appellate courts, for the cases recognize and establish the principle that the issues presented upon a cross-complaint and answer are entirely separate and distinct from the issues raised upon the original complaint and answer. In the case of Millar v. Millar, 51 Cal. App. 718 [ 197 Pac. 811 ], it is held that the purpose of allowing a cross-complaint is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and thereby save vexation and expense, and that such a situation involves merely a consolidation of two independent actions arising out of or related to the same transaction. See, also, Mott v. Mott, 82 Cal. 413 [ 22 Pac. 1140 ], and Warner v. Darrow, 91 Cal. 309 [ 27 Pac. 737 ], The code provisions also recognize this distinction. Section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing a dismissal of a suit by the plaintiff before trial provides that such dismissal may not be had where affirmative relief is sought by way of cross-complaint, and our courts in construing said section so hold. (Islais & Salinas Water Co. v. Allen, 132 Cal. 432 [ 64 Pac. 713 ] ; Clark v. Hundley, 65 Cal. 96 [ 3 Pac. 131 ]; Robinson v. Placerville & Sacramento Valley R. Co., 65 Cal. 263 [ 3 Pac. 878 ].) For like reasons a cross-complainant cannot dismiss his cross-complaint after the filing of an answer thereto, asking affirmative relief. (Rodgers v. Parker, 136 Cal. 313 [ 68 Pac. 975 ].) It therefore seems plain to us that the issues raised from the cross-complaint and answer are completely severable from the issues upon the original complaint and answer, and a plaintiff has no such control over a cross-complaint as would entitle him under the circumstances to ask for its dismissal under the code provision invoked.”