[1] Municipal Corporations—Ordinance—Use op Streets—Permission op Mayor.—Under a provision of a city ordinance declaring that any person can have the use of any public street for any proper and lawful purpose for a reasonable time on obtaining permission therefor from the mayor of the city, a permit given by a member of the council is not authorized.

[2] Public Nuisance—Obstruction op Street.—An obstruction of a public highway is a' nuisance under the general law and under a municipal ordinance prohibiting the obstruction of public streets.

[3] Municipal Corporations—Use op Streets por Private Purposes.—Except where the use is temporary or the power has been delegated by the legislature, a municipality has no power to authorize the use of streets for a private purpose, nor to grant to an abutting owner the right to so eonstruet his building as t.o encroach on the street, or to use the streets for stands or booths for business purposes.

3. Eight of abutting owner to permanent use of subsurface of street or highway, note, 7 A. L. E. 646.

Eight of abutting owner to use street including sidewalk for the deposit, exhibit or sale of goods, note, 6 A. L. E. 1314.

Power of municipality to establish or license market stalls or stands in public street, note, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 352.

[4] Id.—Use of Street fob Lumber-yard—Falling of Lumber—Liability for Death.—A municipal corporation has 'no authority either under the general law or under a municipal ordinance allowing a private use of a street for a reasonable time to allow a lumber company to use a part of a street for a lumber-yard for a number of years, and the piling of the lumber in the street constitutes a public nuisance, and the company is liable for the death of a person resulting from the falling of the lumber.

[5] Workmen’s Compensation Act — Action by Employer for Death of Employee—Notice of Injury—Actual Knowledge.— Under section 20 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Stats. 1913, p. 290), an employer had actual knowledge of an accident sufficient to entitle it to bring suit for the death of its' employee without being served with written notice of the injury, where its foreman visited the scene before the deceased was removed and while the circumstantial evidence of the cause of death was still manifest to observation.

[6] Id.—Death of Employee — Payment of Compensation to Family—Right' of Subrogation.—Where an employer has paid compensation to the family of a .deceased employee, he is entitled, under section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to be subrogated to the rights of the family and to bring suit for damages against the third person whose negligence caused the death.

[7] Id.—Action by Employer—Evidence—Dependency of Widow of Deceased Employee.—In an action brought by an employer under section 31 of the .Workmen’s Compensation Act for the death of an employee against a third person whose negligence caused the death, the defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of testimony that the widow of the deceased was dependent upon him for support, where it appeared that she had received four thousand five hundred dollars in compensation and three thousand five hundred dollars in life insurance.

[8] Id.—Relevancy of Dependency.—The right of subrogation given to an employer under the Workmen’s Compensation Act only exists in the ease of a lawful claim against an employer by persons wholly or partially dependent upon the employee for support, and this makes the fact of dependency relevant in an action by the employer for the injury or death of the employee.

[9] Subrogation of Employer—Provision Constitutional.—The provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act concerning the right of subrogation of the employer is merely a legislative recognition of the equitable doctrine of subrogation, and does not go beyond the purview of article XX, section 21, of the constitution fixing the liability of employers.

[10] Id.—Killing of Employee—Falling of Pile of Lumber in Street—Death in Performance of Duties of Employment— Sufficiency of Evidence.—In an action brought by an employer under section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to recover for the death of an employee killed by the falling of a pile of lumber placed in a city street by a lumber" company, the conclusion of the jury that the deceased was engaged in the performance of the duties of his employment at the time he was . killed is justified by facts in evidence from which it is to be inferred that he, having completed his tasks at the office of the plaintiff, was about to proceed to other duties of Ms employment which involved the use of a horse and wagon, and while unhitching the horse which was tied near the lumber he was killed.

[11] Id.—Action by Employer—Measure of Damages.—Where an |,ction is brought under section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act by an employer against a third person for the death of an employee, the measure of damages is not fixed in the act, but the employer must pay the dependents of the employee the difference, if any, over and above the amount paid by the employer.

[12] Id.—Transfer of Right of Recovery to Employer—Making of Claim by Widow of Deceased Sufficient.—In view of the fact that section 19a of the Workmen’s Compensation Act gives the right of recovery to the widow bf the employee and not to the minor children, the making of a claim by the widow alone is sufficient to transfer to the employer the right to recover established under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

[13] Id.—Right of Action by Employer Independent of Carrier— When Proper.—Where an employer has paid the widow of a deceased employee the compensation provided by law, he is entitled to maintain the suit against the third person for such death, regardless of the claim that the right of action is in the insurance carrier of the employer, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier has paid the compensation or served notice upon the widow that it accepted the responsibility.

[14] Id.—Contributory Negligence — Pleadings —• Instruction.—In an action by the employer under section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the death of an employee, where contributory negligence was not pleaded as a defense, the answer alleging that the injury was wholly the result of the negligence of the deceased, which amounted to nothing more than a denial of negligence 'on the part of defendant, an instruction that contributory negligence was not a defense in the action was properly given.

[15] Id.—Amount of Damages—Pecuniary Loss—Element of Loss of Care of Father—Instructions.—In an action by a subrogated employer for the death of an employee who left a widow and minor children, instructions on the measure of damages which authorized the jury in arriving at the pecuniary loss to consider the element of loss of care in the case of the children cannot be made the subject of complaint by defendant, in the absence of request for a more pointed and emphatic instruction limiting the liability to pecuniary loss.