These consolidated causes were transferred to this court after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard of the Fourth District being the author of the opinion, because we were in doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of that court with respect to two notes, in the sums of $5,000 and $400 respectively. A further consideration has convinced us that the District Court of Appeal correctly determined the matter, and we adopt the major portion of the opinion therein rendered, as follows:

In the last-cited case, however, the language of the will was such as to indicate a general release. The testatrix there devised the residue of her estate to trustees with authority “to invest and keep the same invested in such manner as they shall deem best, and to pay the net interest, income and profits thereof into the hands of my said son John Garry Wightman, M. D., from time to time so long as he shall live free from his present or future debts, contracts and engagements”. In Dougherty v. Rogers, supra, the will contained the following clause: “I will devise and bequeath to Philo Rogers, the young man I raised, in addition to all I have already given him, the further sum of $500.” In an action upon notes aggregating $6,000, evidence of the relations of the parties was admitted to show what was meant by the expression “in addition to what I have already given him”. In Ziegler v. Eckert, supra, in speaking of the admissibility of the parol evidence, the court said: “It is not adduced to control the will but to rebut a presumption on a matter extrinsic to it; and its competency to so do is established.” While the language of some of the authorities cited by the respondent indicates that in some jurisdictions an intention to discharge a debt may be proven by matters dehors the will, yet the above references to the authorities relied upon and those in our own jurisdiction convince us that ordinarily the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will exclusive of his other declarations and that evidence of his declarations cannot be received in the absence of uncertainty or ambiguity appearing upon the face of the will. This is so, not only for the purpose of preserving the sanctity of the written declarations, but it is also founded upon the reason that the testator's lips have been sealed. While we would not deny to the readers of an instrument the same light that the writer employed, yet it must be borne in mind that he has endeavored to express his intention in the instrument, and that he who is charged with the interpretation thereof should be careful not to substitute another in its stead.

Estate of Tompkins, 132 Cal. 173 [ 64 Pac. 268 ], illustrates our meaning and closely approaches the present ease. In that case the testatrix had released two of her sons from obligations and declared that they were canceled. Six years later she directed by her will that the amounts of the obligations should be deducted from their interests and the court said: “The instrument of release was executed in 1886 and whatever motive may have then prompted her to give it, she was not thereby precluded from making, in 1892, such testamentary disposition of her property as she desired; and if she deemed it just or proper, for the purpose of bestowing upon each of her children an equal portion of her property, that the amounts received by these sons should be deducted from their shares, she was at liberty to express such purpose in her will, and if so expressed it is the duty of the court to carry it into effect. Whether such was her intention must be determined from the terms of the will itself. The will must be interpreted by the language which she has used therein, and cannot be affected by an instrument made by her several years previous, and to which she makes no reference. The circumstances under which the will is made are to be taken into view only when there is an uncertainty 1 arising upon the face of the will’, and only for the purpose of ascertaining ‘from the words of the will’ the intention of the testator. (Civ. Code, sec. 1318.) Even if it could be shown that her execution of the document of 1886 had escaped her memory, it would merely result that the purpose or motive for directing the deduction was produced by 'a mistake or oversight, and would constitute no reason for disregarding the language of her will” While related to somewhat different subjects, Estate of Franck, 190 Cal. 28 [ 210 Pac. 417 ], and Estate of Donnellan, 164 Cal. 14 [ 127 Pac. 166 ], generally support the rule.

The language of the will in the present ease is clear, unequivocal and free from any ambiguity. The bequest was made in appreciation of the kindness and attention shown to the testatrix by Mrs. Childs. No situation has been shown to exist which would permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a cancellation of the notes was intended.

A number of other points are raised by appellant which need not be considered in view of the conclusion reached upon the point just discussed.

The portion of the judgment denying recovery to appellant on the first action filed, involving the notes for $5,000 and $400 respectively is reversed. That portion of the judgment involving the second action filed, denying recovery of the $2,500 note, is affirmed.

Seawell, J., Preston, J., Langdon, J., Curtis, J., and Waste, C. J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.