Negligence — Street Railroads — Injury to Passenger Riding on Platform—Res Ipsa Loquitur—Misleading Statement of Rule of Law.—The statement that “the rule of law is that where an injured passenger is riding in an unusual position, which position increases his danger, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply, and no presumption arises that resulting injury was due to the negligence of the carrier,” is misleading, it being obvious that the proof may show 'that the passenger was riding in an unusual position which increased his danger, and may also show that the injury arose from something done by the carrier in operating the car, in which ease a prima facie ease of negligence is made, and the burden is east on the carrier to show that the thing done by it which caused the injury was not the result of its negligence.

Id.—Injury from Manner of Operating Oar or from Plaintiff’s Carelessness—Question fob Jury.—Where there is a dispute over the question whether- an injury to a passenger arose from the manner of operating the car or from plaintiff’s carelessness in standing too near the edge of the car platform, the question as to which was the cause of the injury should be left to the jury.

Id.—Plaintiff’s Opportunity to Secure Safety—Conflicting Evidence.—In an action for injury to a passenger on a street railway car who was thrown from the platform of the car on which he was riding while rounding a curve, where it was claimed by the defendant that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not entering the body of -the ear when the opportunity offered, and there was evidence on behalf of the defendant to show that such opportunity did present itself, but evidence for the plaintiff went to show that every seat in the body of the ear was occupied, that passengers were crowded in the aisle, and several were standing on the platform where the plaintiff was, the determination of those disputed facts, under the circumstances, was for the jury.

Id.—Standing on Platform not Negligence Per Se.—Standing on the front platform of a moving electric ear is not, in this state, negligence per se.

Id.—Assumption by Passenger of Risk—Instruction Properly Refused.—The trial court was justified in refusing an instruction requested in such ease by the defendant to the effect that if the plaintiff, for his own convenience, was riding on the platform and was thus exposed to dangers which he would not have incurred within the car, and if he could have entered the car a reasonable time before the accident and remained inside until the accident, he assumed responsibility for the increased risks, and if he was injured solely in consequence of such increased risks, the verdict must be for the defendant, since the requested instruction charged the plaintiff with the assumption of all increased risks, whereas the only increased risks he assumed were those occasioned by his position, and arising from the due operation of the car; he did not assume the increased risks of any misconduct of the motorman in such operation.

Id.—Sudden Swaying or Jerk of Car—Instruction Refused.—A requested instruction, in such case, that if the plaintiff was thrown from the car by any swaying motion or sudden jerk, ordinarily incident to the running of ears, t'he verdict should be for the defendant, was also properly refused, since it implied that the plaintiff assumed the risk of such a jerk, even if it arose from the reckless operation of the car by the mot'orman, who had knowledge of the plaintiff’s presence on the platform.

Id.—Contributory Negligence—Erroneous Instruction.—An instruction that, in effect, told the jury that as matter of law, notwithstanding the passenger’s place of added peril on the platform, which the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed, a legal presumption of negligence arose against the defendant by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff sustained injury, was erroneous.

Id.—Instructions—General Approval of.—The supreme court’s approval generally of instructions is not a specific approval of an instruction not criticised.