Practice—Nonsuit—Sufficiency of Evidence to Preclude Granting. —A motion for a nonsuit should not be granted where the plaintiff’s evidence ip such, if the case had gone to a jury on that evidence, and a verdict had been rendered for him, the evidence would be held sufficient to support the judgment upon the verdict. The rule is the same, whether the trial is by the court or by a jury.

Id.—Action to Quiet Title—Prima Facie Case as to Portion of Land—Granting Nonsuit Erroneous.—If the plaintiff either in an action of ejectment or to quiet title makes out a prima facie case as to a part only of the land claimed, it is error to grant a motion for nonsuit not limited to the particular portion as to which no case has been made.

Id.—Possession Not Essential to Action to Quiet Title—Allegation of Ownership Sufficient.—In an action to quiet title under section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no allegation of possession of the land in question is essential. The action may be maintained by a person whether in or out of possession, and an allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff is “the owner in fee” of the premises is a sufficient statement of his right to maintain either that action or ejectment.

lo.—Prima Facie Case of Ownership—Evidence op Actual Possession at Commencement of Action—Pleading Ownership Without Possession.—In such an action, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, in order to put the defendants to their proof, to make out a prima facie case of ownership, but no more was required of him. This requirement was met by uncontroverted evidence that at the time the action was commenced, the plaintiff was in the actual possession of the land. The fact that he simply alleged ownership, without in terms alleging possession, did not restrict his proof of ownership to evidence of a paper ar record title.

Id.—Actual Possession Sustains Finding of Ownership against Stranger' to Title.—As against an entire stranger to the title, actual possession of land has uniformly been held, both in ejectment and actions to quiet title, to make out a prima facie ease, sufficient to sustain a conclusion of ownership.

Id.—Tnclosure by Wire Fence — Adverse Possession — Claim of Ownership—Sufficient Evidence of Actual Possession.—Evidence that the'plaintiff, less than two days prior to the commencement of the action to quiet title, inclosed the greater portion of the land in question in two separate parcels by the construction of substantial five-strand barbed wire fences, with redwood posts, twelve or fourteen feet apart, making two complete inclosurcs, and thenceforth claimed to be the owner of the property so inclosed, is sufficient to show an adverse possession, within the meaning of section 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to support a conclusion of actual possession of the inclosed portions on the part of the plaintiff, and, in the absence of any evidence of possession thereof by the defendants or other persons, precluded the granting of a nonsuit as to the portions actually inclosed.

Id.—Possession Taken in Anticipation of Action.—The fact that the plaintiff’s possession was taken by him in contemplation of the action to quiet title less than two days before the commencement thereof, and with a view to the possible advantage to be obtained by him by being in possession at the time of the commencement of the proposed action, does not detract from the effect of his actual possession at the commencement of the action, as prima fa