Action for False Imprisonment of Married Woman—False Charge of Grand Larceny—Arrest by Constable—Parties—Wife a Necessary Party.—In an action for damages for the false imprisonment of a married woman by a constable upon a false and pretended charge of grand larceny, the husband and wife may be joined as parties; but the wife is a necessary party without whom there can be no recovery upon the cause of action alleged.

Id.—Damages—Community Property—Form of Action—Exception to Bule of Husband’s Sole Control.—Though the right of action and the damages recovered are community property, this form of action is an exception to the rule that the husband has control of the community property and may sue or be sued alone where it is concerned.

Id.—Death of Husband Pending Suit—Proper Substitution of Personal Bepresent attve .—The husband being a proper party to be joined with the wife, upon his death pending suit the administratrix of his estate, as his personal representative, was properly substituted as a party co-plaintiff with the wife.

Id.—Action on Official Bond of Constable.—Though an action will not lie against the sureties on the official bond of a constable for trespasses committed not under color of office, nor in the line of his official duty, yet such action will lie when the constable arrested and imprisoned a party upon a false and pretended charge of felony, he having the right by virtue of his office to make an arrest upon said charge without a warrant.

Id.—Sufficiency of Complaint Against Sureties.—Where the complaint against the constable and the sureties on his bond alleges that the constable, “acting in his official capacity as constable, did arrest and imprison the plaintiff on a pretended charge of grand larceny,” it sufficiently shows the official character of the constable’s acts; but even if the form of the averment be deemed of a conclusion of law, the complaint is sufficient as against a general demurrer, where other allegations show a case of trespass committed by the constable, “while attempting to perform some official act in the general line of his official duties.”

Id.—Liability of Constable—Instructions.—The constable was liable for any wrongful act committed by him whether done officially or otherwise, and instructions based upon his acts alone that “if he unlawfully violated the personal liberty of the plaintiff, Magdalena Gomez, or if, after making the arrest, he restrained her of her liberty for an unreasonable length of time without taking her before a magistrate, such detention constitutes a false imprisonment, and the jury must find a verdict for the plaintiffs,” have relation only to a verdict as against him.

Id.—Instruction as to Liability on Official Bond.—It is sufficient that in an instruction bearing directly on the liability of the sureties on the official bond of the constable, the jury were properly instructed that a verdict against such sureties should be rendered only if the constable was guilty of á false imprisonment of Mrs. Gomez, “while acting in his capacity of constable of the 11th township.” Such instruction removed any ambiguity in the other instructions based on the action of the constable as affecting his liability.

Id..—Measure of Damages Against Constable and Sureties—Detriment Proximately Caused—Anticipation not Required.—The court properly instructed the jury that the measure of damages is the amount which will compensate the plaintiffs for all the detriment proximately caused by the injury, whether it could have been anticipated or not, which rule of compensating damages also applies to the sureties on the official bond of the constable, who have thereby made themselves responsible for all torts committed by the principal in his official capacity; and their undertaking cannot therefore be governed by the measure of damages for mere breach of a contract.

Id.—Damages not Excessive—Discretion of Jury.—Held, in view of the facts proved, that it cannot be held as matter of law that the damages awarded to the plaintiff in the sum of two thousand dollars was so great as to show that it was rendered by the jury under the influence of passion or prejudice. In eases of this kind the extent to which the allowance may go must in large measure be left to the sound discretion of the jury; and where this court cannot say that the verdict is so disproportionate to the injury proved that it cannot be the result of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the jury, its verdict will not be disturbed.