This proceeding comes before this court at this time after the granting of the motion of respondents for a rehearing thereof. In the decision upon the former submission the award of the Industrial Accident Commission in favor of the employee Pulliam was annulled by this court on the ground that his claim for benefits instituted against his employer and the insurance carrier was barred by certain provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Stats. 1917, p. 831) and “that said subsection (e) of section 27 did not- have the effect of extending the statute of limitations on Pulliam’s claim against the petitioners; and, as a consequence, that it was outlawed, at the time he instituted proceedings for the collection of his claim.” At the time of the consideration of the petition for rehearing of said cause a serious doubt arose in the minds of the members of this court as to the correctness of this conclusion and for this reason said petition for a rehearing was granted. After a further consideration of this question we are now of the opinion that the effect of subsection (e) of section 27 of said act (Stats. 1923, p. 771) was to extend the statute of limitations in favor of Pulliam, and that as extended the statute was not a bar to the prosecution of his entire claim against the petitioners herein. To a large extent, however, the opinion of the court at the former hearing, written by Mr. Justice Houser, sitting as justice pro tem., contains a correct expression of our present views of the questions considered therein, and that portion of said opinion to which we now adhere and hereby adopt is as follows:

It is clear from the decisions of the court of this state as well as those of other jurisdictions that a person has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely run and barred the action. Before the action is barred by the statute the legislature has ab solute power to amend the statute and alter the period of limitations prescribed therein, subject only to the requirement that a reasonable time must be allowed for the prosecution of an action or proceedings after the passage of an amendment shortening the period (Doehla v. Phillips, 151 Cal. 488 [ 91 Pac. 330 ]; Swamp Land Dist. v. Glide, 112 Cal. 85, 90 [ 44 Pac. 451 ]; Crothers v. Edison Electric Co., 149 Fed. 606, 609 ; 5 Cal. Jur. 755; Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 517 [ 27 L. Ed. 808 , 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 854]; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., pp. 167, 168, 171; 36 Cyclopedia of Law (Cyc.), 1201). It is equally well settled that an amendment to a statute of limitations enlarging the period of time within which an action can he brought as to pending causes of action is not retroactive legislation and does not impair any vested right (Weldon v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 432 [ 90 Pac. 1062 ]; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184 [16 L. R. A. 646, 30 Pac. 213 ]; kerchoff-Guzner Mill & Lumber Co. v. Olmstead, 85 Cal. 84 [ 24 Pac. 648 ]). In Weldon v. Rogers, supra, page 433, the court said: “Now, appellant contends that this amendment is not applicable to the judgment involved in the case at bar, because to so apply it would be to hold it to be retroactive, and a statute is not to be construed as retroactive unless that meaning clearly appears upon its face. But, really, we do not see how any question arises here as to the retroactive operation of said amendment of April 9, 1895, to section 685. At the time of that amendment the said judgment in Weldon v. Rogers was an existing judgment not barred by the statute of limitations, and in full force and effect. The amendment was not in the nature of a revival of that judgment; it did not need revival. The applicability of the amendment to that judgment, as well as to all other live judgments existing at that time, is not, therefore, of retroactive applicability.” In 36 Cyclopedia of Law (Cyc.), page 1201, the rule is laid down in the following language: “A retroactive or retrospective law, in the legal sense, is one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Retrospective laws, in their general sense, include ex post facto laws, and laws impair ing the obligation of contracts, but the term ‘retrospective’ is frequently used as applicable only to civil laws by way of distinguishing them from ex post facto laws. Retrospective statutes are usually considered to embrace only those which relate to substantial rights, as those which destroy or impair an existing right, or give a right which never before existed; and statutes which affect remedies only are not within the scope of the inhibition against retrospective laws, unless the remedy is entirely taken away, or is encumbered with conditions which render it impracticable.” Again, on page 1213 of the same volume, we find the following: “The presumption against the retrospective construction of statutes is founded on the principle that they should not be given such a construction as will make them unconstitutional or unjust, and therefore as a general rule does not apply to statutes that relate merely to remedies and modes of procedure. The legislature has full control over the mode, times, and manner of prosecuting suits; and whenever, upon consideration of an entire statute relating to these matters, it appears to have been the legislative intent to make it retroactive, it will be given this effect. A retroactive effect has accordingly been given statutes . . . relating to the limitation of actions . . . ” As to the effect upon existing claims or causes "of action of a general statute of limitation, Wood on Limitations lays down the rule as follows: “If before the statute bar has become complete the statutory period is changed, and no mention is made of existing claims, it is generally held that the old law is not modified by the new so as to give to both statutes a proportional effect; but that the time past is effaced and the new law governs. The period provided by the new law must run on all existing claims in order to constitute a bar.” (1 Wood on Limitations, sec. 12, p. 59.) The rule- enunciated by this author is relied upon by the court in Crothers v. Edison Electric Co., swpra. Judge Wolverton, in rendering the opinion in the last-named ease, quoted with approval the following language from Sohn v. Watterson, 17 Wall. 596 [ 21 L. Ed. 737 , see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes]: “When a statute declares generally that no action, or no action of a certain class, shall be brought, except within a certain limited time after it shall have ae erued, the language of the statute would make it apply to past actions as well as to those arising in the future,”

From the foregoing authorities it appears to us that there can be no question but that subsection (e) of section 27 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act extended the time within which proceedings could be instituted in the case of an ineffectual settlement like that made by the insurance carrier herein with Pulliam to two years after the receipt of the injury, and that such amendment applied not only to claims that might arise in the future but also to all existing claims not then barred by the statute of limitations. Pulliam was injured, as we have seen, January 11, 1923. He would therefore have had until January 11, 1925, within which to commence proceedings upon his claim. As this proceeding was commenced on June 17, 1924, it was in time and the statute of limitations then in force was not a bar to the prosecution thereof.

There is no merit, in our opinion, in the suggestion of petitioners that subsection (e) of section 27 is in the nature of a penalty and should therefore be strictly construed as applicable to only such claims as might arise subsequent to its going into effect. Aside from the general provisions of said act (sec. 69, subd. [a] ) requiring courts to liberally construe its terms, other good reasons occur to us why we should not place any strict and technical interpretation upon said subdivision (e) of section 27. This subsection only applies to a release or settlement made for an amount less than the full compensation or benefit to which an employee or his dependents may be entitled under said act. It must be obvious, therefore, that no employee would make a settlement for less than he was entitled to except through ignorance of his rights. If ignorant of his rights as to the amount of compensation to which he would be entitled he may also be ignorant of any right on his part to institute a proceeding to recover compensation. Having made a purported settlement he would be less liable after such settlement to seek advice and ascertain his rights under the statute than he would have been had no settlement been entered into by him. It is a wise and humane provision of the law to permit such a person under such circumstances additional time in which to act in order to protect his rights. This is particularly so when the only persons who can possibly object to such a construction are those who have taken advantage of Ms ignorance and imposed upon him an unjust settlement.

Were these the only questions to be considered it would be our duty to enter an order denying the petition and affirming the award. It is conceded, however, by the parties hereto that the award in favor of Pulliam is excessive. By reference to several sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act it will be readily seen that subsection (e) of section 27 extends the period of limitation two years for the collection only of medical benefits as provided by subsection (a) of section 9 of said act and does not apply to disability payments provided by subsection (b) of said section 9. The Commission found that the injury sustained by Pulliam caused temporary total disability and made an award for compensation based thereon. It further found that “the employee is in need of further medical, surgical and hospital treatment to cure and relieve him from the effects of said injury and the insurance carrier is liable to furnish the same.” As the extension of the limitation con-' tained in subsection (e) of section 27 did not apply to disability compensation provided for under subsection (b) of said section 9, Pulliam’s claim therefor was barred at the time of the commencement of said proceedings before the Industrial Accident Commission, and the award of the Commission in his favor for this reason must be annulled. But as Pulliam’s claim for medical, surgical, and hospital treatment was not barred by any provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he still has the right under the terms of said act and the findings of the Commission, as to his claim for further medical, surgical, and hospital treatment, to prosecute the same before said Commission. It is therefore ordered that said award be and the same is hereby annulled, without prejudice, however, to the right of said Pulliam to further prosecute before said Commission his claim against said insurance carrier for medical, surgical, and hospital treatment.

Seawell, J., Waste, C. J., Shenk, J., Lennon, J., Cashin, J., pro tern., and Richards, J., concurred.