Judgment by Default—Refusal to Vacate—Conflict of Evidence. —When the evidence is conflicting as to the alleged fact upon which alone a defendant claimed the right to be relieved from a default judgment, the decision of the trial court refusing to vacate the judgment is conclusive on appeal.

Id.—Amendment After Default—Service on Defaulting Defendant.—Where, after the default of a defendant has been entered, a complaint is amended in matter of substance as distinguished from mere matter of form, the amendment opens the default, and unless the amended pleading be served on the defaulting defendant, no judgment can properly be entered on the default.

Id.—Amendment After Judgment by Default—Service of Amendment Unnecessary.—Where, however, in an action against several defendants, a judgment is entered against a defaulting defendant before any amendment was made, there being at the time of such judgment a good and sufficient complaint on file with a copy of which he had been duly served and which constituted the basis of the judgment, the action, at the time of the amendment, had been finally disposed of as to him, and it was unnecessary to serve the amended complaint on him. Under such circumstances, the defaulting defendant could not be “affected” by the subsequent amendment, within the meaning of section 432 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor was he longer an “adverse party” within the meaning of sections 465 and 472 of that code.

Id.—Defendants Charged as Joint Tort-Feasors—Default against One Defendant—Continuance of Action against Other.—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries against two defendants who are jointly charged to have been guilty of the negligence alleged to have been the cause of the injuries, the court has power, under sections 579 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to render a several judgment by default against one of the defendants, and to allow the action to proceed against the other.

Id.—Judgment against Other Defendant—Satisfaction—Judgment not A- Bar.—It is no objection to such practice, that the court might proceed to the trial of the case as against the remaining defendant, and enter up a new and separate, and perhaps a different, judgment from the one entered against the defaulting defendant. No bar arises as to any of the joint wrongdoers until the injured party has received satisfaction, or what in law is deemed its equivalent, and a judgment against one wrongdoer which remains wholly unsatisfied is not such satisfaction.