This is an appeal from a judgment in an action to quiet title to andi declare a trust in certain lands situated in Kern County, California. We quote and adopt the following statement of facts from the opinion rendered in this case by the district court of appeal and written by Mr. Justice Knight:

[1] We are of the opinion that the decree of the trial court cannot be sustained, for the reason that neither the pleadings nor proof justify that portion of the findings and decree determining that a trust exists in the lands. Respondent’s rights under the contract of May 29, 1913, are: That he shall receive one-third of the selling price of any and all of the said lands; that this one-third of the selling price shall be paid to respondent at the times and in the manner and according to the same terms as the remaining two-thirds are paid to appellant; that there shall be no deduction on account of any mortgage or other lien or encumbrance made, done, or suffered by appellant, its successors, or assigns. It is apparent from a recital of the substance of the provisions that the contract conferred upon respondent nothing more than a right to one-third of the proceeds when the lands are sold. There is a distinction between an interest in the land itself and an interest in the money obtained from the sale of the land. (Green v. Brooks, 81 Cal. 328, 332 , [ 22 Pac. 849 ].) In the cases of Green v. Brooks, supra, and Hannah v. Canty, 175 Cal. 763, [ 167 Pac. 373 ], cited (by respondent in support of the theory that a trust exists, the person claiming to be the beneficiary of the trust was, in effect, one of the purchasers of the land in question and had a direct interest therein. The contract relied upon by respondent, however, does not, by any possible construction, purport to pass a present interest in the lands to respondent nor to provide for the holding of the lands or any interest therein for the benefit of respondent, nor is there anything from which any such intention can fairly be inferred. There is, therefore, no express trust, and respondent does not contend that any other kind of trust exists. It is clear from the uncontradicted evidence that the appellant corporation refused to part with any interest in the lands, and it follows that the decree imposes upon the parties terms not within the purview of their agreement in that it compels appellant to sell the lands, although appellant is still the sole owner thereof. The decree creates further rights in -favor of respondent by depriving appellant of the right to control the terms of the sale and placing the same in the hands of a receiver despite the fact that the parties contemplated and stipulated that appellant should .determine all the conditions of sale, with the single proviso that the price should not fall below $150 per acre.

It is unnecessary to discuss the several other points raised upon the appeal, for the sole object of the action is to declare a trust in the lands. It having been determined that no trust exists, respondent’s action necessarily fails.

The judgment is reversed.

Shaw, J., Sloane, J., Olney, J., Angellotti, C. J., Wilbur, J., and Lawlor, J., concurred.