Action for breach of contract. Judgment was for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from the judgment and order denying a new trial. The alleged contract was evidenced by certain telegrams and letters between Mr. Charles F. Whittlesey, who was appellant’s agent, and the respondent. So much of the correspondence as is pertinent is as follows:—

The respondent corporation refused to cancel the order, and shipped 1080 barrels of cement to Los Angeles. This shipment was declined and no more cement was sent. Judgment was given for the loss caused by demurrage and cost of resale of this shipment and as to the remaining 5920 barrels in accordance with the provision of section 3311 of the Civil Code. Appellant contends that there Avas no meeting of the minds of the alleged contracting parties, while respondent’s position is that Mr. Whittlesey’s telegram of the 11th: “Your wire eleventh place order for seven thousand barrels particulars by letter to-day,” and the respondent’s letter of the same day, together with its telegram of the day folloAving: “Wire received. Order booked. We await letter particulars,” constitute the closing acts in the contract. We find ourselves unable to agree with this view. Ignoring the final sentence of Mr. Whittlesey’s telegram “particulars by letter to-day,” there is abundant evidence in respondent’s own telegram and letter that the contract was not considered complete. The former communication advised Mr. Whittlesey that the order was booked—not accepted—and referred to the expected letter of particulars, while the latter contains this very significant language: “Referring to our first wires as to reference. ' You were entirely unknown to us, but investigation since has resulted satisfactorily and we would feel honored to open business relations with your good self. Earnestly hoping to have the pleasure of serving you, we are,” etc. There was not that meeting of the minds of the parties which must take place before a contract is complete. Upon this subject, in the case of Four Oil Co. v. United Oil Producers, 145 Cal. 624 , [ 79 Pac. 366 ], Mr. Justice Henshaw used the folloAving language: “The rules for determining whether or not a proposal and acceptance constitute a binding contract are well settled, and by this court have been expressed in the following language: ‘To constitute a binding contract made in this form (letters), there must be a proposal squarely assented to. If the acceptance be not unqualified, or go not to the actual thing proposed, then there is no binding contract. (1 Wharton on Contracts, sec. 4.) A proposal to accept, or an acceptance based upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer. (National Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43, 51 .) An offer imposes no obligation unless it is accepted upon the terms upon which it was made. (Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 161 .) An acceptance must be absolute and unqualified. A qualified acceptance is a new proposal. (Civ. Code, sec. 1585.)’ (Wristen v. Bowles, 82 Cal. 84 [ 82 Pac. 1136 ].)” That there was not here a “proposal squarely-assented to” seems too obvious to require further argument.

It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and it is so ordered.

Henshaw, J., and Lorigan, J., concurred.