Habeas Corpus—Proceedings after Petition—Pleading—Traverse—■ Burden of Proof.—The function of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to secure the issuance of the writ, and when the writ is issued, the petition has accomplished its purpose. The writ requires a return by the officer or other person having the custody of the prisoner. To such return the petitioner may present exceptions, raising questions o-f law, or a traverse, raising issues of fact, or both. Where the return is not subject to exception,—that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for holding the prisoner, such process being produced at the hearing, and the traverse alleges matter tending to invalidate the apparent effect of such process,—the burden of proving such new matter is on the petitioner. Adopting the analogy of pleadings in civil actions, the return is the complaint, the traverse is the answer; new matter set up in the traverse is deemed denied, and must be proved by the party alleging it.

Criminal Law—Extradition—Trial for Other Offense — Offense Committed Subsequent to Extradition.—So far as relates, to international as distinguished from interstate extradition, it is the general rule that a prisoner extradited from a foreign country for a particular offense cannot be tried upon any other charge until his trial upon the original charge has been brought to a final conclusion, and he has had a reasonable time within which to return to the country from which he had been extradited. Such rule, however, only applies to crimes alleged to have been committed prior to his extradition, and does not apply to crimes committed after his extradition in the country to which he was returned, and while his trial on the charge for which he was extradited remains undetermined.

Id.—Treaty of 1889 between United States and Great Britain— Extradition Act of Canada—Revised Statutes.—Neither articles HI nor IY of the extradition convention concluded between the United States of America and Great Britain in the year 1889, nor the Extradition Act of the Dominion of Canada, nor section 5275 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, exempts a person extradited from the province of British Columbia to the state of California from being tried in that state for a crime there committed subsequent to his extradition and while his trial on the charge for which he was extradited remains undetermined.

Id.—Intent of Parties to Treaty—Treaty of 1842.—Article III of that convention, providing that “no person surrendered by or to either of the high contracting parties shall be triable or tried for any crime or offense, committed prior to Ms extradition, other than the offense for which he was surrendered, until he shall have had an opportunity of returning to the country from which he was surrendered, ’ ’ by limiting the exemption to crimes committed prior to extradition, indicates an intent on the part of the contracting parties that persons surrendered should not be exempt from prosecution for crimes subsequently committed. If under the treaty of 1842 between the United States and Great Britain there was any exemption for such subsequent crimes, the exemption was removed by the convention of 1889.

Id.—Extradition Act of Canada—Surrender in Contravention of Act.—The provision of the Extradition Act of the Dominion of Canada prohibiting the extradition of any person to any state or country "in which, by the law in force in such state or country, such person may be tried after such extradition for any other offense than that for which he was extradited, unless an assurance shall first have been given by the executive authority of such state or country that the person whose extradition has been claimed shall not be tried for any other offense, ’ ’ only has the effect to lay down a rule for the government of officials of the Dominion of Canada. They may under this act have had the right to refuse to surrender an accused person without receiving the assurance referred to in the act. If they did surrender him without such assurance the rights of the United States and of the state of California after receiving the prisoner were limited only by the provisions of the treaty.

Id.—Perjury on Trial for Prior Perjury—Effect of Judgment— Habeas Corpus.—A prisoner indicted for and convicted of perjury alleged to have been committed as a witness in his own behalf on his trial under an indictment for a prior charge of perjury, and which trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury, is not entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus on the' ground that the perjury with which he was charged in the second indictment consisted in swearing to some of the same matters which formed the basis of perjury in the first indictment. Whatever might be the effect of an acquittal or conviction in one trial is matter of defense to be relied on in the other. It does not go to the jurisdiction and affords no ground for release on habeas corpus.

Id.—Voluntary Surrender after Giving Bail.—A prisoner arrested under an indictment and extradition proceedings thereunder who was released on bail and who thereafter voluntarily surrendered himself into custody and has not since given bail, and whose trial has not been unreasonably postponed against his objection, is properly held in custody under a bench warrant issued upon such indictment and extradition proceedings.

Id.—Writ of Error to Supreme Court of United States—Admission to Bail Pending—Effect of Remand on Habeas Corpus.—When, after a hearing upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,' a prisoner has been remanded to the custody from whence he came, there is ordinarily no proceeding to be stayed pending a review of that order on writ of error to the supreme court of the United States. The prisoner is not thereafter held by virtue of the order of remand, but by virtue of the warrant or other process upon which he was held at the time the writ of habeas corpus was issued, and the power to admit him to bail belongs exclusively to such officer, if any, as had the power to admit him to bail independent of the habeas corpus proceeding, and he must make his application for bail in the usual manner as provided by the laws of this state. [Per Beatty, O. J.]