Employment of Women—Eight Hours Law—Act of March 22, 1911, Is Constitutional.—The act of March 22, 1911, (Stats. 1911, p. 437), forbidding the employment of women for more than eight hours a day in certain places, is constitutional, so far as it applies to women employed in hotels.

Id.—Constitutional Law—Provisions of State Constitution Hot "Violated..—The act is not in violation either of section 18 of article XX of the state constitution, providing that “no person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation or profession”; or of section 1 of article I, declaring that all persons have an inalienable right to enjoy life and liberty and to acquire and possess property; or of section 11 of article I, requiring that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; or of section 21 of article I, prohibiting the granting of privileges or immunities to any citizens, or class of citizens, which, upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens; or of section 25 of article IV, prohibiting the passing of special laws, granting to any individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.

Id.—Discriminations on Account of Sex—Valid Police Regulations —Hours of Labor.—Section 18 of article XX of the constitution, prohibiting any such discrimination based solely on distinctions of sex, like other constitutional guarantees, is subject to such reasonable regulations as may be imposed in the exercise of police powers. It does not forbid such reasonable restrictions upon the hours of labor of women as may be necessary for the protection and preservation of the public health.

Id.—Right of Contract Subject to Limitations under Police Power. —Although the act provides a punishment only for the employer, its prohibition applies to both employer and employee, and it clearly restricts the liberty of both, in the specified establishments, to freely contract with each other as to the length of a day’s service or to perform such contract when made.

Id.—Preservation of Public Health, Safety, and Morals—Legislative Discretion.—The right of an individual to so contract is in itself subject to certain limitations which the state may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers, for the purpose of preserving public health, safety, or morals, ■ and a large discretion is vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.

Id.—Limitations on Police Powers — Reasonable Assumption of Injury to Public.—The police powers of the legislature in this connection are not absolute or unlimited, and the personal right to contract cannot be taken away or impaired at its mere will, nor at all, unless the public welfare demands it. So far as the effect on himself alone is concerned, each person has the absolute right to judge for himself whether the hard labor which he voluntarily performs is for his best interest or not. The legislature cannot judge for persons in this respect and interfere solely to prevent them from injuring themselves by excessive labor. The injury must be of such character and extent and to such a number of persons that it may be reasonably supposed that it will cause injury to others, that is, to the community in general, or, as it is expressed, to the public health and general welfare.

Id.—Legislative Determination Subject to Review by Courts.—The means adopted to produce the public benefit intended, or to prevent the public injury, must be reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The determination of the legislature as to these matters is not conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts, and if the above qualities are wanting, a law arbitrarily interfering with the right of contract, or imposing restrictions upon lawful occupations, will be held void.

Id.—Laws Restricting Hours op Women’s Labor—Physical Reasons Justifying.—The application of short hour laws exclusively to women is justified on the ground that they are less robust in physical organization and structure than men, that they have the burden of child-bearing, and, consequently, that the health and strength of posterity and of the public in general is presumed to be enhanced by preserving and protecting women from exertion which men might bear without detriment to the general welfare.

Id.—Laws Presumed Constitutional—Presumption as to Police Regulation.—The courts must always assume that the legislature, in enacting laws, intended to act within its lawful powers and not to violate the restrictions placed upon it by the constitution. Consequently, this statute must be taken as intended for a police regulation to preserve, protect, or promote the general health and welfare.

Id..—Necessity of Law—Facts Justifying Classification—Review by Courts.—The determination by the legislature that facts exist which make such a law necessary, and also with regard to the facts upon which a lawful classification and discrimination depend, must not be set aside or disregarded by the courts, unless the legislative decision is clearly and palpably wrong and the error appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice.

Id.—Reasonable Limitations of Hours of Labor.—If reasonable men, upon a consideration of the facts, might rationally conclude that the restrictions would promote or preserve, in some appreciable degree, the public health or general welfare, the law must be deemed a proper exercise of the police power, although other reasonable men might take the opposite view.

Id.—Limitation of Hours of Labor of Females Employed in Hotels. —In view of the reasons which justify a restriction upon the hours of employment or labor of women, as distinguished from men, and the differences of opinion, among those familiar with the subject, as to the injurious effect of labor for more than eight hours daily, the court cannot hold, that a limitation to eight hours a day of the time of employment in many of the occupations mentioned in the act, including the employment in hotels, is unreasonable as a health regulation.

Id.—Special Legislation-—Exemption of Other Similar Occupations. —The law is not rendered special legislation because there may be no reasons for making the restrictions as to the particular employments mentioned in the act which do not apply with equal force to other similar occupations. If there are good grounds for the classifieation made by the act, it is not void because it does not include every other class needing similar protection or regulation.

Id.—When Laws Are General and Uniform in Operation.—A law is general and uniform in its operation when it applies equally to all persons embraced -within the class to which it is addressed, provided such class is made upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it. It is not general or uniform, and it makes an improper discrimination, if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar restrictions or disabilities upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a larger number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges granted or burdens imposed, and between whom and the persons not so favored or burdened no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such privileges or burdens. The difference on which the classification is based must be such as, in some reasonable degree, will account for or justify the peculiar legislation.

Id.—Exemption of Women Employed in Lodging and Boarding Houses-—Justification of Classification.-—The law is not rendered special nor discriminatory because it applies to women employed in hotels and does not apply to women employed in lodging houses and boarding houses. In support of such classification, it will be assumed that the legislature determined that the conditions surrounding the hotel employees rendered their work more arduous, and materially different from the work of those similarly employed in lodging or boarding houses.

Id.—Exemption of Persons Engaged in Harvesting, etc., Perishable Products.—The exemption in the act of persons employed in harvesting, curing, canning, or drying perishable fruits or vegetables from the operation of the law, is not an improper discrimination. The classification is justified by the facts that such', occupations are engaged in only for a short period of each year, and by the greater necessity, from the standpoint of the general welfare, for facility in obtaining employees to do the work than obtains in ordinary employments, in order to avoid loss ensuing from the perishable nature of the products to be preserved.

Id.—Title of Act—Only One Subject Embraced In.—The title of the act embraces but one general subject;—the regulation of female employment. The subdivision of this subject by the particular details stated in the title does not make it embrace two subjects.