Adoption—Statutory Right—Strict Compliance With Statute.—The right to adopt a child and the right of a person to be adopted as the child of another are wholly statutory, and unknown to the common law, and he who claims that an act of adoption has been accomplished must show that every essential requirement of the statute has been strictly complied with.

Id.—Nature op Proceeding—Jurisdictional Requirements.—An adoption proceeding is essentially one of contract between the parties whose consent is required, and the law has wisely thrown around its creation certain safeguards, hy requiring, not only that it shall be entered into in the presence of a judge, but also that it shall receive his sanction, which is not to he given until he has satisfied himself that the person adopting is ten years older than the child, that all the parties whose consent is required have given such consent fully and freely to the making of the contract, and that the adoption contemplated by the contract will be for the best interest of the adopted child.

Id.—Daw op 1892.—Under the law in force in 1892, the following things were necessary to a valid adoption, namely, the consent of the wife of the adopting party, if a married man, not lawfully separated from his wife, and she be capable of consenting; the consent, in writing, duly acknowledged, of the mother of the child, or due proof that she had abandoned the child; the agreement of the adopting party, signed in the presence of the judge of the superior court of the county in which said party then resided, to the effect that the child should be adopted by him and treated in all respects as his own lawful child should be treated; the consent of the child, in writing, signed hy him before the judge, to the adoption, if over the age of twelve years; and the examination by the judge of the persons required to appear before him, his decision therefrom that the interests of the child would bq promoted by the proposed adoption, and the making of an order by the judge declaring that the child should thenceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the adopting party.

Id.—Destruction of Adoption Papers—Proof by Secondary Evidence —Code Presumptions Insufficient.—Where papers and proceedings for adoption have been destroyed, secondary proof thereof is admissible, but such proof is not sufficiently made by the mere presumptions stated in subdivisions 15 and 16 of section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure “that official duty had-been regularly performed,” and “that a court or judge, acting as such, whether in this state or any other state or country, was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction.”

Id.—Jurisdiction in Adoption Cases.—Jurisdiction in cases of adoption, although the court be one of general jurisdiction, must appear by the record, as to both subject matter and person, and the judge so acting is to be regarded and treated in that respect as a court of limited and special jurisdiction.

Id.—Inferior Tribunal—Jurisdictional Facts—Burden of Proof.— Where one relies on an adjudication of a tribunal of limited or special jurisdiction, he must show affirmatively every fact necessary to confer jurisdiction.

Id.—Nature of Proof.—Jurisdictional facts must be proven, either by the record or by other evidence, and neither the fact that' a judgment or order was made and that it appeared on the record, nor the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, is sufficient proof of the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal. >

Id.—Jurisdictional Facts—Manner of Proof—PResumptións.—The provisions of subdivisions 15 and 16 of section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not to be construed to dispense with the necessity of proof of the facts essential to the jurisdiction of an inferior court or tribunal, and that they apply only to the acts of such inferior court after jurisdiction of subject matter and person has attached.

Id.—Proceeding on Partial Distribution of Estate—Claim of Alleged Adopted Son—Evidence—Failure to Prove Adoption.—In a proceeding for the final distribution of the estate of a deceased person wherein the right of an alleged adopted son of the deceased to have distributed to him a part of the estate was contested on the ground that he was not such an adopted son, and it was admitted that the papers and proceedings for the adoption had been destroyed, there was an utter failure of proof as to such adoption where no copy of any paper was proven or offered or testimony given as to the contents, substance, or effect of any writings, and it was shown by extrinsic evidence that at the time of the alleged adoption the person adopting was a resident of another state, and that his wife, who was capable of consenting and not separated from her husband, did not sign a consent thereto, and no testimony given that the alleged son, who admitted that he was over twelve years of age at the time of the alleged adoption, had given his written consent to the adoption.

Verdict—Power of Court to Direct.—In a proper ease the trial court has full power to direct the jury to render a verdict, and this power exists in favor of the defendant where there is no substantial evidence tending to prove all the controverted facts necessary to establish the plaintiff’s case.

Id.—Befusal to Beturn Directed Verdict—Procedure.—Where the jury is directed to return a verdict and a part of the jury refuses to obey the order, the court is not confined to a proceeding against the refractory jurors for contempt to enforce its order, but may direct the members of the jury not refusing, to return the verdict, and in such a case the polling of the jury is a useless ceremony.

Id.—Directed Verdict—Decision Upon Merits.—A directed verdict is a decision upon the merits of the case, and is a bar to another action for the same cause.