The petitioner is a scavenger in the city of Oakland, and was convicted of gathering and removing garbage in violation of an ordinance of that city, and his conviction in the police, court of the city of Oakland was affirmed in the superior court of Alameda County. The petitioner claims that the ordinance under which he was arrested and convicted is void and unconstitutional. The ordinance in question is entitled “Ordinance No. 2257,” and the. provisions thereof involved in the consideration of the case are sections 1, 2, 7, 8, and 21, the latter section as amended by ordinance designated No. 2269, the amendment consisting in adding the portion following the word “provided” in section 21. The sections of said ordinance referred to are as follows, to wit:—

The ordinance also declares:—

On the part of the petitioner it is contended:—

1. That the ordinance in question is void, because it is unreasonable, unfair, partial, and discriminating; and it is said that the persons affected by it are the purchasers of garbage, waste matter, and ashes in the city of Oakland, and that the ordinance is not uniform in its operation, because it makes an arbitrary and senseless discrimination between the charge for the removal of garbage accumulated at a private dwelling-house and that accumulated at any store, shop, business house, or boarding-house, or any place not a private residence. It might be remarked in passing, however, that the persons referred to as being injuriously affected by the ordinance are not complaining here,—to wit, owners of private dwelling-houses,—but a person who gathers up and removes garbage in a mode and manner not authorized by the ordinance in question. It may be, also, that the cost of collecting and removing garbage, where the quantity is less, as at private houses, may justify a difference in the cost of removal; besides, it is provided that the ashes and waste matter of the householders shall be removed without charge; and this might have been considered sufficient to equalize the expense of removal. A municipal ordinance must be very clearly obnoxious to such objection before it will be declared invalid. “Every intendment is to be indulged in favor of' its validity, and all doubts resolved in a way to uphold the lawmaking power; and a contrary conclusion will never be reached upon light consideration. It is the province and right of the municipality to regulate its local a flairs—within the law, of course—and it is the duty of the courts to uphold such regulations, except it manifestly appear that the ordinance or by-law transcends "the power of the municipality, and contravenes rights secured to the citizen by the constitution, or laws made in pursuance thereof.” (Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 416 , [ 44 Pac. 725 ]; Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal. 432 , [58 Pac. 916]; Ex parte Lemon, 143 Cal. 563 , [ 77 Pac. 455 ].) In this latter case this court upheld an ordinance of the city of Marysville which imposed a lower license upon hotels and boarding-houses where the meals were wholly cooked and served by the proprietor and members of his family than upon all other hotels and boarding-houses. It is said in that case: “We must, however, judge of the reasonableness of the ordinance in question by what we. know of the general conditions, and not hold it void simply because in some exceptional case it may result in imposing unequal burdens. . . . The classification here adopted is probably no more likely to practically result in unfair discrimination between those similarly situated as to amount of business than a classification according to a number of rooms in a hotel or the number of employees in a laundry, and the ordinary effect of the enforcement of the. provision as it stands will be that those doing the greater amount of business will pay the higher tax fixed thereby.”

Petitioner’s counsel seem to rely upon Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606 , [ 28 Am. Rep. 642 ]. But that involved an ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco which exacted a license for selling goods, fixing one rate of license for selling goods within the corporate limits, or in transit to the city, and another much larger license for selling goods which were not in the city or in transit to it; and it was properly held in that case that such ordinance was unjust, unequal, partial, oppressive, and in restraint of trade. That, however, has no relation to the exercise of police power to prevent or to abate a nuisance, as in the case of garbage, slaughter-houses, etc.

2. It is also contended on behalf of petitioner that the fees for the removal of garbage must be based on quantity, and not determined by the place from which the garbage, is re moved. The authority for the ordinance is found in section 11 of article XI of the state constitution, granting a power to municipal corporations, such as cities and towns, to make and enforce, within their limits all such local, police, sanitary,- and other regulations as are not' in conflict with general laws.Putting hotels, shops, and boarding-houses into one class, and private dwellings into another, it would seem is based upon the relative quantity of garbage produced by them, and it cannot be said to be an unfair or unreasonable way of determining such matter. Besides, the ordinance provides that such garbage shall be removed only by the city or its authorized agents in the manner designated in the ordinance.

3. It is further contended on behalf of petitioner that the ordinance is void because it makes the removal of garbage from dwellings a penal offense, and not from other places, but it will be seen that the first section of the ordinance declares that the city of Oakland, its authorized agents, servants, or employees, shall have the exclusive right to gather and collect garbage within said city, and it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation, except as otherwise provided in this ordinance, to collect or gather garbage within said city. As the section stands, it forbids all persons not expressly authorized to collect or remove garbage.

4. It is further claimed that the ordinance in question violates section 11 of article I of the constitution, which provides that “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” This provision of the constitution has no application to ordinances of a city of the character in question. In Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 146 , [ 44 Pac. 915 , 45 Pac. 1057 ], it is said: “There is no constitutional provision which expressly requires the uniform operation of municipal ordinances. Nevertheless, where they unjustly discriminate, they are sometimes declared unreasonable and therefore void.” A law is general which applies to all of a class—the classification being a propér one, and the requirement of the constitutional provision in question is satisfied if it applies to all the class alike. “The word ‘uniform’ in the constitution does not mean universal. The section intends simply that the effect of general laws shall be the same to and upon all persons who stand in the same relation to the law—that is, all the facts of whose cases are substantially the same.” (People v. Judge Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547 . See, also, Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 375 , [ 14 Pac. 888 ]; Ex parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 35 , [ 2 Pac. 728 ]; Ex parte Jackson, 143 Cal. 573 , [ 77 Pac. 457 ].)

. 5. It is next objected on the part of petitioner that the city has no power to exact a fee from householders for the removal of garbage. . The_ petitioner, however, is not convicted of a refusal to pay for removing garbage; further, by the ordinance itself, refusal to pay for the removal of garbage is not punishable by fine or imprisonment, the only remedy being an ordinary civil action. This point, however, has been settled against the contention of the petitioner. (SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ; Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591 , [ 49 Am. St. Rep. 222 , 37 N. E. 402 , 39 N. E. 869 ].) “Laws or ordinances enacted under the police power for the protection of the public health, reasonably adapted to that end, are not unconstitutional because they may incidentally operate to deprive individuals of their property or its use without compensation, or interfere with their personal liberty, nor because they may give one person a monopoly of a certain business or occupation, private rights being required to yield in such case to the public good.” (California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 126 Fed. 29 .)

6. It is further claimed, on behalf of the petitioner, that the ordinance in question is an admitted police regulation, and is unconstitutional because, its scope exceeds the police power of the city of Oakland; that the city does not possess the power of invading private premises and removing garbage therefrom—garbage not being a nuisance per se.

The removal and disposition of garbage, as well as the regulation of slaughter-houses in cities and towns, is peculiarly a subject of municipal control, as without proper regulation either might become an intolerable nuisance and dangerous to the health and lives of the citizens.

The city of Oakland is organized under a freeholders’ charter, as prescribed by the constitution of the state; by such charter the city council is given power by ordinance, “to declare what shall constitute a nuisance and abate the same,” and to regulate “business of every description that may endanger the public safety, health and comfort.” Ordinances and regulations enacted by such city in pursuance of. its charter have the same force and effect within the limits of the city as laws passed by the legislature. They both spring from the. same source—the state constitution enacted by the people in their sovereign capacity.

Writ discharged and prisoner remanded.

Shaw, J., Angellotti, J., McFarland, J., Lorigan, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.