A petition for hearing in this court was granted in the above cause after decision by the district court of appeal, third appellate district. In said petition it was urged by the appellant that an important provision of the contract upon which the action was founded had been overlooked in the decision of the district court of appeal. No reply was made to this petition by the respondent. After careful consideration of the entire record we are of the opinion that the decision of the district court of appeal, third appellate district, written by Mr. Justice Hart, correctly states the law of this case and considers every material legal element involved therein with the exception of one additional feature urged by the appellant upon its petition for hearing in this court, which we shall discuss hereinafter. Accordingly we accept and adopt the said decision of the district court of appeal, as follows:

“This action was brought by plaintiff to recover the sum of $3,063.65 alleged to be the amount due on a contract of guaranty executed by the defendant for the purpose of indemnifying the former against any loss which it might incur by reason of taking over by purchase certain notes or other evidences of indebtedness accruing in favor of a certain partnership with which the defendant was connected as a co-partner. The cause was tried by the court, sitting' without a jury, and plaintiff was awarded judgment for the sum of $1,668.70, from which this appeal is prosecuted by the defendant upon a record made up in pursuance of the provisions of section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure.

“The plaintiff, a corporation, as its name to an extent implies, is what is known as an acceptance corporation, engaged in the business of buying and discounting conditional contracts of sale of motor vehicles and promissory notes and other written evidences of indebtedness given" to dealers in such vehicles by those purchasing the same on credit.

“The defendant, at the time he executed the contract of guaranty upon which the plaintiff declares, and one J. A. Anderson were, as copartners and under the firm name of ‘Modesto Motors Co.,’ engaged, in the city of Modesto, in the business of selling the Oakland, the Davis, the Paige and the Haynes automobiles. The Oakland automobile was manufactured by a corporation known as the ‘ General Motors Corporation.’ The copartnership arranged to discount its automobile paper—notes, conditional contracts of sale and other written evidences of indebtedness owing to it by purchasers of the automobiles from it on time credit—and to perfect said arrangement, and in pursuance of a demand by plaintiff therefor, the members of the partnership (defendant and Anderson) executed and delivered to plaintiff, on the 8th day of April, 1920, although the instrument was dated March 30, 1920, the contract of guaranty upon which this action is predicated. The said guaranty provides as follows:

After the foregoing opinion was filed by the said district court of appeal respondent petitioned for a rehearing of said cause, which petition was by said court denied and an opinion filed in response to said petition, in which it was pointed out that the contracts purchased by the plaintiff from the Modesto Motor Company, Inc., which are the basis of defendant’s alleged liability, showed upon their face that they were between purchasers of automobiles and Modesto Motor Company, Inc., and not the partnership of that name.

The only question raised by respondent’s petition for a hearing by this court which has not been answered by the foregoing opinions of the district court of appeal is predi cated upon the language of the guaranty, as follows: “The benefits and obligations hereof shall extend to and bind the heirs, administrators, successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto.”

It is contended that under this provision the defendant was bound to guaranty the obligations of the corporation as the successor or assign of the partnership. The contention seems worthy of but brief consideration. First, according to the record, the corporation was not the successor or assign of the partnership. Both entities existed at the same time and conducted different business operations. Second, the parties to the contract of guaranty were the plaintiff and the defendant, and not the Modesto Motor Company. The record, therefore, presents no question involving the heirs, administrators, successors, or assigns of the respective parties to the contract of guaranty.

The judgment is reversed.

Richards, J., Seawell, J., Preston, J., Shenk, J., Waste, C. J., and Curtis, J., concurred.