Appeal—Written Opinions of Trial Judge Embodied in Record—Support of Findings.'—Written opinions of the trial judge, notwithstanding these are embodied in the bill of exceptions used on appeal, cannot be considered in determining whether or not the findings are sufficiently supported by the evidence.

Mortgage—Fraud on Creditors of Mortgagor—Evidence—Findings not Supported.—In an action to foreclose a mortgage, in which the defense was interposed by a judgment creditor of the mortgagor that the mortgage and the note secured thereby were without consideration, and were executed by the mortgagor with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and were accepted by the mortgagee with knowledge of such facts and with the intent to assist the mortgagor in such fraudulent purpose, it is held, upon a review of the evidence, that the findings sustaining such defense are not supported by the evidence.

Id.—Mortgage Given for Valuable Consideration—Burden of Proof —Mortgagee’s Knowledge of Fraudulent Intent of Mortgagor. In such action, if a valuable consideration for the note and mortgage were shown, the burden of showing the mortgagee’s knowledge of a fraudulent intent on the part of the mortgagor was on the judgment creditor.

Id.—Consideration for Mortgage—Loan to Mortgagor—Failure to Arrange for Bate of Interest at Time of Loan—Execution of Mortgage Specifying Bate—Inference of Fraudulent Intent.— Where a loan of money to the mortgagor was the consideration for such note and mortgage, and nothing was arranged at the time of the loan as to the rate of interest it should bear, the fact that the note and mortgage subsequently accepted called for interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum compounding quarterly, did not warrant any inference of a fraudulent intent on the part of the mortgagee with relation to the other creditors of the mortgagor.

Id.—Acceptance op Evidence op Indebtedness in Excess op Amount Due—Evidence Tending to Show Fraud.—The acceptance by a creditor from a debtor known to be financially involved of an evidence of indebtedness calling for more than is due, either in principal or interest, is not conclusive evidence of fraud. At most such a fact may be evidence tending to show fraud, which is purely a question of fact and not of law, except as otherwise provided in sections 3440 and 3442 of the Civil Code. Its importance as a circumstance tending to show fraud is necessarily dependent upon the facts of the particular ease.