On rehearing we are satisfied with and reassert the views expressed in our former opinion filed December 27, 1930, except as to one point. On the question of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission, after the two hundred and forty-five weeks of continuing jurisdiction had expired, to make the award of “further medical and hospital treatment as (the injured employee) may reasonably need from time to time”, we have reached a different conclusion, as will presently be made to appear, from that first announced. As to all other matters, we adopt our former opinion, viz.:

Section 20 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, after dealing with what the Commission shall do after final hearing, and what matters may be included in an award, provides in subdivision (d) that the Commission “shall have continuing jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions and awards made and entered under (the general sections relating to compensation) and may at any time, upon notice, and after opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, rescind, alter or amend any such order, decision or award made by it upon good cause appearing therefor, such power including the right to review, grant or regrant, diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits prescribed by (the) act, any compensation awarded, upon the grounds that the disability of the person in whose favor such award was made has either recurred, increased, diminished or terminated ; provided, that no award of compensation shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after two hundred forty-five weeks from the date of the injury ...” The order of June 28th, which directed the telegraph company to furnish the employee such further medical and hospital treatment as he may reasonably need in the future “to cure and relieve him from the effects of said injury”, was made by the Commission more than two hundred and fifty-eight weeks subsequent to the date of the injury. While we cannot say whether or not the denial'of the right of the Commission to make the questioned order in this case will work a hardship on the mentally incapacitated employee some time in the future, the legal question involved is of such importance by reason of its relation to the whole system of compensation for industrial injuries that we granted a rehearing for the sole purpose of examining into this particular phase of the present case.

The order of March 7th, which gave the applicant a permanent total disability rating, granted him a weekly com pensation for two hundred and forty weeks, and a pension at the rate of $12.82 per week for the rest of his life; but made no provision for future medical and hospital care. The employer petitioned for a rehearing, protesting against the compensatory features of the award. The applicant, in his answer to this petition, set out the facts establishing his lapses of speech and memory, and submitted that the award “should be amended to provide for such hospital and medical attention as his condition might require ... in the future”. The record discloses that both the petition and the answer were filed with the Commission within the two hundred and forty-five weeks’ period, but were not acted upon by the Commission until after that period had expired.

The Commission relies upon language of this court in the case of Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 203 Cal. 522 [ 265 Pac. 195 ], where the court, referring to the enlargement of the powers of the Industrial Accident Commission, if exercised within the period of “continuing jurisdiction”, brought about by the amendment to the Workmen’s Compensation Act adopted by the legislature in 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 831 et seq.), said ( 203 Cal. 537 [ 265 Pac. 195, 201 ]) : “ ... placing within the discretion of the Commission the power to modify prior awards on equitable grounds is not uncommon”. The Commission contends that the present ease presents a case of “equitable grounds” which should clothe it with power to correct a mistake in an order made within the two hundred and forty-five weeks’ period. Granting that there may be some plausibility in that theory under some appropriate procedure adapted to that end, we are not inclined to attach much weight to it in the present situation. But we are of the opinion that there is a theory upon which the action of the Commission in this case may yet be sustained.

The legislature is vested by the state Constitution with plenary powers, unlimited by the Constitution itself, to create and enforce a complete system of workmen’s compensation by appropriate legislation. (Const., art. XX, see. 21.) The legislature has done so, and one of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act declares that whenever any of the provisions of the act are to be “interpreted by a court, it shall be liberally construed . . . with the purpose of extending the benefits of the act for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment”. (Workmen’s Compensation Act, sec. 69a.) One of the purposes of the act is to make “full provision for such medical, surgical, hospital, and other remedial treatment as is requisite to cure and relieve from the effects of (an) injury” sustained by workmen in industry. (Const., supra.) An injured employee, although permanently disabled, is entitled to such medical and hospital treatment as may be reasonably required to relieve him from the effects of his injury. (U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 207 Cal. 144 , 152 et seq. [ 277 Pac. 492 ].) Consequently, in making the order here questioned, the Commission was within its jurisdiction as to the subject matter, and, under the rule announced in the U. S. Fidelity case, just cited, we are of the view that it may be regarded merely as an order intended to make fully effective the award previously made. If we are correct in this view, the Commission was acting wholly within its powers, for, by section 63(a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is “vested with full power, authority and jurisdiction to do and perform any and all things, whether (therein) specifically designated, or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of any power, authority or jurisdiction conferred upon it under (the) act”.

The question of medical and hospital treatment appears, from the record of this case of serious injury to the employee, to have been constantly in the minds of the parties and of the Industrial Accident Commission and its referees who conducted the various hearings. Following the making of the first order and award in the case, in which the previously incurred and future medical treatment for the employee was held to be necessary, there were supplemental hearings for the purpose of determining whether or not the employee was permanently injured, and to determine the extent to which he would require future medical treatment and hospital care. The diagnosis or finding of the Commission in the so-called final award, that the injury to the employee “caused permanent disability consisting of psychoneurosia, psychasthenia, hysterical anaesthesia, and periods of amnesia”, would seem to convey to one of common knowledge that a patient in that condition would not only be apt to need medical treatment and hospital care in the future, but would, in all likelihood, be certain to require it. The reasoning in the U. S. Fidelity case, supra, seems to persuasively apply to the facts now under consideration. If, as seems quite probable, the failure to carry into the order of March 7, 1929, the finding and provision for the future medical treatment for the employee, which was under consideration all the time the Commission had continuing jurisdiction, was caused by inadvertence and mistake, that fact was “good cause” and a sufficient ground upon which to grant the rehearing of the order. (Standard etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 208 Cal. 532, 536 [ 282 Pac. 948 ].)

The award, including the order of June 28, 1929, is affirmed.

Curtis, J., Richards, J., Preston, J., Seawell, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.