This proceeding was originally brought in the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, where an opinion was rendered, written by Mr. Justice Marks, and concurred in by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard and Mr. Justice Jennings. We adopt as our own the following portion of said opinion:

We are in accord with the conclusion reached by the District Court of Appeal, as above stated, that the action of Van Horn v. Van Horn should have been commenced in the superior court of the county of San Bernardino. In other words, the superior court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of said action. If so, its jurisdiction was exclusive,-and the Justice’s Court of San Bernardino Township had no jurisdiction over the same. (Shipp v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. 671 [ 289 Pac. 825 ].) There can be no such thing as concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter of an action in the superior court and in the justice’s court, except in the few cases mentioned in the Constitution and this is not one of them. As is said in a previous part of this opinion, where the jurisdiction of the justice’s court ends, the jurisdiction of the superior court begins. There is no overlapping of jurisdiction, and no option is given to a litigant to select one or the other of these two courts in which to institute his action. The law has done this for him. The Constitution and statutes of this state, above cited, have definitely fixed and determined the respective jurisdictions of these two courts. In counties where a justice’s court of larger jurisdiction exists and there is no municipal court in said county, if under section 832 of the Code of Civil Procedure the action can be commenced in said justice’s court, then that court has exclusive jurisdiction thereof, but if it cannot be commenced in the justice’s court and the amount of the demand exceeds $300, then the action must be commenced in the superior court. As the action filed in the justice’s court was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior court, the appearance of the defendant therein did not confer jurisdiction of said action upon the justice’s court. (Shipp v. Superior Court, supra; Marin M. W. Dist. v. North Coast W. Co., 178 Cal. 324, 328 [ 173 Pac. 473, 474 ] ; 7 R. C. L. 1043.) In Marin M. W. Dist. v. North Coast W. Co., supra, it is said: “It is the universal rule that jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be conferred upon a tribunal by consent, and it follows that the parties cannot make an effective waiver of a lack of such jurisdiction.” The cases of Olcese v. Justice’s Court, 156 Cal. 82 [ 103 Pac. 317 ], Vance v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 327 [ 191 Pac. 945 ], and Gulick v. Justice’s Court, 101 Cal. App. 619 [ 281 Pac. 1031 ], relied upon by petitioner, are not applicable here as they involve simply the waiver of jurisdiction of the person, while the jurisdiction which we are considering involves the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.

Petitioner relies with some assurance upon our decision in People v. Justice’s Court, 212 Cal. 603 [ 299 Pac. 731 ], which was a proceeding in mandate to compel the respondent court to set aside its order quashing summons and to proceed with the trial of the action pending before it. That action had been brought in the Justice’s Court of the Township of Sacramento, which township had a population exceeding 30,000 inhabitants, under a statute directing that the same should be commenced “in a court of competent jurisdiction in the County of Sacramento”. As the amount involved therein was over $300 and less than $1,000, it was brought in the Justice’s Court of the Township of Sacramento. No question was raised in the proceeding of People v. Justice’s Court, supra, but that the action in the justice’s court was brought in the proper court. The only point made was that the action having been brought in the justice’s court, the summons therein could not be served out of the county in which the justice’s court was situated. We held that section 831h of the Code of Civil Procedure applied in such a case, and authorized the service of summons as in actions pending in the superior courts. There is nothing in that decision inconsistent with the conclusion at which we have arrived in this action. We simply held that the order quashing the summons was unauthorized and directed the justice’s court to proceed with the trial of the action.

The peremptory writ is denied.

Shenk, J., Langdon, J., Preston, J., Seawell, J., Tyler, J., pro iem., and Waste, C. J., concurred.